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MOVING BEYOND MEDICAL DEBT

&

BROOK E. GOTBERG*
MICHAEL D. SOUSA**
ABSTRACT

In recent years it has become clear that medical costs are imposing severe
financial burdens on American families, sometimes to the point that bankruptcy
becomes the only escape from crippling debt. When evaluating the well-established
connection between outstanding medical debt and consumer bankruptcy, most
existing empirical studies attempt to quantify the percentage of consumer
bankruptcies that are "caused" by unmanageable medical indebtedness. This Article
addresses what we believe to be a more significant line of empirical inquiry, namely,
the connection between health insurance coverage and consumer bankruptcy as a
more precise measurement of how national health insurance programs may or may
not affect bankruptcy filing rates. Data from a national longitudinal survey of adults
from 2004 through 2014 indicate that the principle predictor of consumer bankruptcy
is a lapse in medical insurance coverage, while controlling for socioeconomic
variables such as race, marital status, household income, and debt-to-income ratios.
Individuals who experienced a gap in coverage over a two-year period were roughly
twice as likely to file for bankruptcy as those who retained continuous coverage.
These findings contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the Affordable Care Act
and the provision of health insurance to low-income Americans, and the role
consistent health insurance coverage plays in relation to the consumer bankruptcy
system.
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INTRODUCTION

What compels individuals and families to file for bankruptcy? Although some
academics argue that debtors file for bankruptcy to intentionally shirk their
contractual financial obligations, 1it is largely agreed upon that bankruptcy usually
follows paradigmatic life events such as job loss, underemployment, divorce, medical
illness, and the death of a spouse.2 Scholars also point to the increased reliance upon
consumer credit in response to stagnant or declining wages as playing a factor in the

1See Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 62 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 1071, 1097 (2005) ("As bankruptcy becomes a less socially stigmatized activity, the reputational harm
from filing bankruptcy falls as well, creating a vicious cycle of eroding norms and rising bankruptcy filings.").
But see Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or AMfore Financial
Distress:An EmpiricalAnalysisof the ExtraordinaryIncrease in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213,
253 (2006) [hereinafter Less Stigma] ("We are confident that the rise in bankruptcy filings over the past twenty
years has not been driven by a decline in stigma, but by economic and social factors, which remain as
unpredictable as ever.").
2See Michelle Lee Maroto, Pathways into Bankruptcy: Accumulating Disadvantageand the Consequences
ofAdverse Life Events, 85 SOC. INQUIRY 183, 184 (2015) (noting "that people's experiences ofjob loss, illness,
and marital dissolution, along with their debt burdens, increase the likelihood of declaring bankruptcy in
different ways"); see also Laura McCloud & Rachel E. Dwyer, The FragileAmerican: Hardshipand Financial
Troubles in the 21st Century, 52 SOC. Q. 13, 15 (2011) ("Studies of vulnerability to bankruptcy identify four
types of hardship that appear to contribute most to financial troubles: health problems, family dissolution, job
loss, and income disruption.").
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decision to file for bankruptcy. 3 Nonetheless, isolating a "cause" of a consumer
bankruptcy filing is a complicated, if not impossible, task, because for most families,
"a confluence of factors rather than a single decision or event" explains the
accumulation of overwhelming debt.4
Despite the inherent difficulty in attributing a specific cause to a particular
bankruptcy filing, academics have often explored the effect of medical debts upon
consumer bankruptcy and have made claims regarding the extent to which medical
debts can be considered responsible for bankruptcy filings overall.5 It is not
unreasonable to assume that medical debts have a role to play in many bankruptcy
filings.
However, the empirical findings, methods employed, and ultimate
conclusions of researchers to the extent of and underlying basis for the association
between medical debts and bankruptcy have been vociferously debated and
challenged, with no clear answer emerging from the melee.
In more recent years, scholars have turned to what we believe to be a more fruitful
line of empirical inquiry regarding financial distress and illness, namely, the
3 See Randy Hodson, Rachel E. Dwyer & Lisa A. Neilson, Credit CardBlues: The Middle Class and the
Hidden Costs of Easy Credit, 55 Soc. Q. 315, 315 (2014) ("Many scholars argue that credit and debt has
replaced income growth in a time of stagnant or declining incomes for many American families.") (internal
citation omitted); see also Joseph N. Cohen, The Myth ofAmerica's "Culture of Consumerism": Policy May
Help Drive American Household's FrayingFinances, J. CONSUMER CULTURE 1, 19 (2014) ("Whether we
blame markets or consumers themselves, consumerism explanations belittle their subjects by pinning these
problems on an obsession with frivolities. Spending growth is being fueled by patently nonfrivolous products,
and many Americans are being thrust into a situation in which they must choose between maintaining
sustainable personal finances and maintaining their access to well-being-essential products."); Jean Braucher,
ConsumerBankruptcy as Partof the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1065, 1066 (2004) ("In particular, gaps in unemployment and health care insurance benefits in the United
States, combined with ready availability of consumer credit, have led to use of credit as a self-financed safety
net, contributing to dramatic increases in personal bankruptcy filings.").
Katherine Porter, Driven by Debt: Bankruptcy and FinancialFailure in American Families, in BROKE:
HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 1, 11 (2012) (describing complex causes of bankruptcy and
explaining research has "pointed to three major life events that families frequently experience before
bankruptcy: job problems, such as unemployment or a reduction in hours; illness or injury; and a major change
in family structure such as divorce or the death of a spouse").
See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47 (1971)
(discussing family health reasons as an underlying cause of financial difficulty in relation to bankruptcy); see
also Daniel A. Austin, Medical Debt as a Cause of Consumer Bankruptcy, 67 MAINE L. REV. 1, 2 (2014)
("The issue of medical bankruptcies continues to be a focal point in the healthcare debate."). See generally
David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, Illness and Injury as
Contributors
to
Bankruptcy,
HEALTH
AFF.
W5-63
(2005),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10. 1377/hlthaff.W5.63 [hereinafter Illness and Injury as Contributors
to Bankruptcy] (calculating in 2001, "1.9-2.2 million Americans (filers plus dependents) experienced medical
bankruptcy"); David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in
Massachusetts: Has Health Reform Made a Difference?, 124 AM. J. MED. 224 (2011),
https://www.amjmed.com/article/S0002-9343(10)00991-5/pdf
[hereinafter Medical Bankruptcy in
Massachusetts] (analyzing the effect of medical debts upon consumer bankruptcy in Massachusetts and
concluding "Massachusetts' health reform has not decreased the number of medical bankruptcies, although the
medical bankruptcy rate in the state was lower than the national rate both before and after the reform"); Carlos
Dobkin et al., Myth and Measurement The Case ofAedical Bankruptcies, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1076
(2018), http://economics.mit.edu/files/14892 (noting "it is impossible to infer the role of medical expenses in
causing bankruptcy without information on the proportion of the population with large medical expenses that
did not go bankrupt") (emphasis in original).
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relationship between health insurance and bankruptcy.6 To date, few studies on this
relationship have been done because of the traditional focus upon medical debts as a
driver of consumer bankruptcy, along with the lack of large-scale, nationallyrepresentative data sets that collect information about both health insurance and
bankruptcy filings at either the aggregate or individual level.7 As is well-known,
Elizabeth Warren and colleagues have utilized the Consumer Bankruptcy Project
("CBP") for several decades to shed illuminating light on the socio-demographics of
bankruptcy filers.8 However, for purposes of probabilistic generalizability, the CBP
data is plagued by a methodological endogeneity problem, namely, sampling on the
outcome of interest: individuals who have filed for bankruptcy protection. 9
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics ("PSID")'0 is another data set relied upon
by some scholars that questions respondents about health insurance coverage and
bankruptcy filings; however, the PSID has asked respondents about bankruptcy
filings in only one year of its fifty-year existence-in 1996." Similarly, the General
Social Survey has asked respondents about bankruptcy filings in only two out of
6 See generally Bhashkar Mazumder & Sarah Miller, The Effects of the Massachusetts
Health Reform on
HouseholdFinancialDistress,8 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POLY 284 (2016) (providing empirical inquiry regarding
financial distress and illness by "evaluating how the provision of health insurance through major state-level
health policy reform affected a variety of financial measures such as . . .personal bankruptcy"); Luojia Hu et
al., The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansions on FinancialWellbeing, 163 J. PUB. ECON. 99
(2018) (discussing the relationship between uninsured individuals and bankruptcy filings); Amy K. Yarbrough
& Robert J. Landry, III, Navigatingthe Social Safety Net: A State-levelAnalysis of the Relationship Between
Medicaid and Consumer Bankruptcy, 35 POLY STUD. J. 671, 674 (2007) ("Although very little empirical
research has been conducted related to medical expenses and consumer bankruptcies, a recent study of
medically related consumer bankruptcies revealed that 25 percent of those filing has no insurance at the onset
of the illness causing the bankruptcy."); Donald D. Hackney, Daniel Friesner & Erica H. Johnson, Did the
Time FrameAssociatedwith the Implementation ofthe PatientProtectionandAffordable CareAct Noticeably
Impact Consumer Bankruptcy Filings?, 44 INT'L J. SOC. ECON. 1957 (2017) (examining the relationship
between health insurance and medical debts accumulated by bankruptcy filers); Tal Gross & Matthew J.
Notowidigdo, Health Insurance and the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision: Evidence from Expansions of
Medicaid, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 767 (2011) (discussing health insurance and "examin[ing] the effect of medical
cost on bankruptcy risk").
See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient:In Search ofNon-Debt BasedAlternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
453, 457 (2004) [hereinafter The Debtor-Patient](noting "data on insurance coverage among bankruptcy filers
remain sparse").
8 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGLE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 5-6 (2000) (explaining the CBP began in the 1980s and is "an empirical
study of the debtors who filed for bankruptcy").
9See id. at 263-65 (providing an in-depth analysis of the data used in the CBP).

10

See

Panel Study

of Income

Dynamics,

UNIV.

OF

MICH.,

INST.

FOR

SOC.

RESEARCH,

https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited May 14, 2019). The Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
commenced in 1968, is a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families
in the United States. Information collected on these individuals and their families includes data covering, inter
alia, employment, income, wealth, expenditures, health, marriage, childbearing, child development,
philanthropy, and education. See id.
11 See Panel Study of Income Dynamics: The Study of Family Economics, 1996 Questionnaire,UNIV. OF
MICH., INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/documents.aspx (follow URL;
select "1990s" dropdown; select "1996" dropdown; select "Questionnaire;" navigate to page 100 to review
questions concerning bankruptcy; and compare with other published questionnaires) (last visited May 14,
2019).
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forty-four years of surveying Americans.1 2 This is one reason why (perhaps
understandably) many quantitative studies on bankruptcy still rely on data that is
approximately two decades old.13
For purposes of this study, we have identified a data set that has largely been
ignored by bankruptcy scholars, namely, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 ("NLSY79"). 4 The NLSY79, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is a
nationally-representative sample of 12,686 young men and women aged 14-22 at the
time when they were initially surveyed in 1979. ' Annual follow-up interviews were
conducted through 1994, with interviews occurring biennially since. 6 Questions
regarding healthcare coverage and bankruptcy filings became a permanent
component of the NLSY79 in 2008. First, as we empirically demonstrate in this
Article, experiencing intermittent health insurance coverage significantly increases
the likelihood of a consumer bankruptcy filing.' Second, the type of health insurance
coverage possessed by an individual is related to the likelihood of experiencing
intermittent coverage. Although our study cannot conclusively contend that lapses
in health insurance coverage "cause" bankruptcy, this strong association, which
remains even after controlling for other variables, suggests that policy approaches
emphasizing uninterrupted access to health insurance, along with robust coverage,

12 See generally The GeneralSocial Survey, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., http://www.gss.norc.org/AboutThe-GSS (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). Since 1972, the General Social Survey ("GSS") has gathered individuallevel data on American society "in order to monitor and explain trends and constants in attitudes, behaviors,
and attributes" of the American population. Id. The GSS is a biannual, representative sample of nonincarcerated, non-homeless American adults, which contains "a standard core of demographic, behavioral, and
attitudinal questions, plus topics of special interest." Id. "Among the topics covered are civil liberties, crime
and violence, intergroup tolerance, morality, national spending priorities, psychological well-being, social
mobility, and stress and traumatic events." Id.
13 See generally Diann C. Moorman & Steven Garasky, Consumer Debt Repayment Behavior as a
Precursorto Bankruptcy, 29 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 219 (2008), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.100

7%2Fsl0834-008-9103-1.pdf (utilizing data from the PSID to explore the relationship between having prior
financial problems and filing for bankruptcy); Angela C. Lyons & Jonathan Fisher, Gender Differences in
DebtRepayment ProblemsAfter Divorce, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 324 (2006) (examining how debt repayment
problems differ for men and women after divorce).
14 Social science scholars have in the past relied upon the NLSY79 to explore various issues related to debt
and bankruptcy. See Randy Hodson, Rachel E. Dwyer & Lisa A. Neilson, Credit CardBlues: The Middle
Class and the Hidden Costs ofEasy Credit, 55 SOC. Q. 315, 326 (2014) (exploring the effect of debt on mental
health); see also Maroto, supra note 2, at 190 (researching how cumulative financial disadvantages can lead
to bankruptcy).
15 See generally National Longitudinal Surveys, U.S.

DEPT. OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,

https://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm (last modified Aug. 24, 2017).
16 See id.

17 See NationalLongitudinal Surveys, 2008 Questionnaire,U.S. DEPT.
OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/questionnaires
(follow URL; select
"2008" dropdown; select "Health" and "Income and Assets;" review survey questions in "Health" that ask
about health care and review survey questions in "Income and Assets" that ask about bankruptcy; compare
and contrast with prior and subsequent NLSY79 questionnaires) (last visited May 14, 2019).
1s See Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributorsto Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at W5-66-W5-71.
This finding mirrors and reinforces a conclusion reached by an earlier study relying on data gathered through
the CBP. See id.
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should be favored in order to reduce the number of individuals who file for personal
bankruptcy every year.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides the reader with a
brief primer on consumer bankruptcy law and its interconnectedness to medical debt.
Part II highlights the importance of medical debt to the issue of bankruptcy, as
demonstrated by past legislative attempts to amend the Bankruptcy Code in order to
explicitly differentiate between debtors whose bankruptcy filings were largely
attributable to medical bills from those that were not. Although not ultimately passed
by Congress, the Medical Bankruptcy Fairness Act raised the normative policy
concern that medically-distressed debtors should be better accommodated by national
bankruptcy laws than debtors in general, reflecting the view that debtors whose
bankruptcies are provoked by medical costs are more sympathetic than other
debtors.1 9 Part III of the Article discusses the existing literature on the relationship
between medical debt, health insurance, and consumer bankruptcy filings and
highlights the gaps that this study has attempted to fill. Part IV is the heart of the
Article, which addresses our methodology, describes our data, and discusses our
empirical findings. Part V discusses the potential policy ramifications of this study
and suggests avenues for future studies.
I. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY AND THE PREVALENCE OF MEDICAL DEBT

The number of consumer bankruptcy cases filed each year rises and falls, usually
in response to national economic trends. 2 0 Nonetheless, approximately one million
individuals and families file for personal bankruptcy each year.2' Individuals
contemplating filing for bankruptcy relief can, in the first instance, choose to file
under chapter 7, chapter 13, or chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code").
However, the decision of which chapter to choose is narrowed by both legal and
practical considerations. First, sections 109 and 707 of the Code place restrictions
upon a debtor's ability to file under either chapter 7 or chapter 13.22 For example, to
remain in chapter 7, the debtor needs to pass a "means test," whereby the debtor's
income in relation to his or her debts cannot exceed certain thresholds.2 3 With respect
to chapter 13, only individuals who have a "regular income" and whose unsecured
and secured debts do not exceed certain amounts are eligible to remain.24 Although

19 See, e.g., Medical Bankruptcy FairnessAct: Hearing on H.R. 901 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
andAdmin. Law ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 89 (2010) (statement of J. Cecelia G. Morris,
Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) ("H.R. 901 moves in the right direction to address the devastating impact of serious medical
problems, and more needs to be done to alleviate the burden on debtors experiencing such events.").
20 See Less Stigma, supra note 1, at 253 (attributing the increase of bankruptcy filings in the recent years to
economic and social factors, as well as a decline in stigma surrounding bankruptcy).
21 See Robert J. Landry, III, An EmpiricalAnalysisof the Causes of Consumer Bankruptcy: Will Bankruptcy
Reform Really Change Anything?, 3 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 2, 8 (2006).
22 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 707 (2012).
23 Id. § 707(b).
24 Id. § 109(e).
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chapter 11 does not place legal limitations upon a debtor's eligibility,2 5 very few
consumer debtors file for chapter 11 bankruptcy due to its expense and complexity. 26
Consequently, most individuals file under either chapter 7 or chapter 13.27
In chapter 13, the debtor retains his or her assets moving forward in exchange for
committing a portion of future income to repay creditors through a court-approved
plan for a period of three to five years.2 8 Of all consumer bankruptcy cases filed
annually, approximately 70% are chapter 7 proceedings.2 9 In chapter 7, the debtor
receives a discharge of his or her debt following the liquidation of all of the debtor's
non-exempt assets (if any) for the collective benefit of the creditor body.30 The debtor
is permitted to retain exempt assets 31 and is permitted to keep his or her post-petition
income out of the reach of creditors.32 Accordingly, chapter 7 embodies the view of
bankruptcy as a "fresh start." 33
An individual debtor's opportunity to receive a fresh start in his or her financial
life is the normative policy underpinning consumer bankruptcy.34 The fresh start in
bankruptcy is characterized by the discharge of most pre-petition indebtedness, 3 5 the
See id. § 109(d). Section 109(d) of the Code provides simply that if an individual "may be a debtor under
chapter 7" then he or she "may be a debtor" under chapter 11. See id.
See Luis Salazar, Too Rich for Bankruptcy: Some Pitfalls of Chapter 11 Filings by Individuals, 9 J.
BANKR. L & PRAC. 527, 527 (2000) ("But by and large such Chapter 11 cases are still limited to those
individuals-such as movie stars, athletes, and business people who have the financial wherewithal to bear
the attendant greater legal costs and have properties and interests that they actually wish to save.").
27 See Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor's Problem in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 407, 413 (2009) (noting "most individuals will file under either chapter 7 or chapter 13").
28 See In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406, 410 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) ("In place of liquidating non-exempt assets to
pay creditors under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress gave individuals with regular income the
option of adjusting their debts pursuant to a plan under chapter 13. The chapter 13 deal permits a debtor to
retain all prepetition property, including earnings, assets, money in the bank and real estate. In exchange for
keeping all of these assets, the debtor must commit all postpetition disposable income to the payment of
creditors under a chapter 13 plan for a period of three to five years.") (internal citations omitted).
29 See Landry, supra note 21, at 8 (noting approximately 70% of consumer bankruptcy filings are chapter 7
proceedings).
30 See Michael D. Sousa, Just Punch My Bankruptcy Ticket: A Qualitative
Study of Mandatory Debtor
FinancialEducation, 97 MARQUETTE L. REV. 391, 402 (2013) (explaining generally the process of a chapter
7 bankruptcy proceeding).
31 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2012) (outlining what a debtor may exempt from his or her estate in a chapter 7
proceeding).
32 See id. § 541(a)(6). Section 541(a)(6) of the Code specifically excludes post-petition income from being
included in "property of the estate." See id.
33 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicyin Bankruptcy Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985).
34 See Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica,A Study ofConsumers'Post-Discharge
Finances:Struggle, Stasis,
or Fresh Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 283 (2008) ("Bankruptcy's central theoretical objective,
from the perspective of the individual debtor, is to afford debtors the opportunity for a 'fresh start."'); see also
Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of PersonalBankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 141 (1999) ("The fresh
start principle generally takes the form of forgiving the debtor part or all of the debts she incurred prior to her
bankruptcy filing."); Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 (2006) ("The principal theory of consumer bankruptcy in America is that it provides
a 'fresh start' to debtors.").
35 See George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The FundamentalsofNondischargeabilityin
ConsumerBankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1998). The entry of a discharge "operates to release an
individual debtor's in personam obligation to pay prepetition indebtedness and serves as a permanent
injunction against any act to collect a discharged debt." Id.
25
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ability of the debtor to retain post-petition income (at least in the chapter 7 setting),
and the debtor's ability to claim exemptions on some pre-petition personal property.36
In perhaps the most-cited consumer bankruptcy case, the Supreme Court articulated
the "fresh start" principle in the following terms:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and
permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."
The
purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts
as being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives the honest
but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt.37
The fresh start principle is perhaps more important now than at any other time in
our nation's history. 38 Today, nearly half of Americans live paycheck to paycheck,
and economic volatility and chronic financial instability are common experiences.39
Compounding these problems and famously termed "The Great Risk Shift" by
political scientist Jacob S. Hacker,40 intentional structural changes in the national and
international economies over the past several decades have caused more Americans

36 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d). At first blush, federal bankruptcy law affords individual debtors a
choice of selecting which assets to exempt from either a prescribed categorization (with monetary thresholds)
found in section 522(d) of the Code or under applicable state law. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional
Limitations on State-EnactedBankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity,
88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 357-58 (2014). If a state "opts-out" of this scheme, then debtors are only able to
claim exemptions under state law. See id. To date, three fourths of the states have opted out of giving debtors
a choice between the federal bankruptcy law exemptions and those provided under state law. See id. Thus,
most debtors can only claim personal exemptions under state law. See id. All fifty states have statutes
prescribing certain exemptions in categories of personal and real property, together with limitations on
amounts. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d); see also Ponoroff, supra note 36, 357-58.
37 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (internal citations omitted) (explaining how a debtor's
ability to discharge his or her debts benefits both the debtor and his or her creditors).
38 See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 97 (1997)
(stating "[b]ankruptcy's fresh start is the legal analogue to divine intervention").
39
See JONATHAN MORDUCH & RACHEL SCHNEIDER, THE FINANCIAL DIARIES: HOW AMERICAN FAMILIES
COPE IN A WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY 168 (2017); see also Mark R. Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, Economic

Security and the American Dream, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 147

(2014) ("The typical life-course pattern is one in which individuals move in and out of economic turmoil as
conditions change in their lives.").
4o See LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES

59 (2017)

(explaining living expenses, such as housing costs and medical expenses, have increased faster than economic
growth due to the toll the financial crash took on the job market thus putting a substantial burden on the middle
class). See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2008).
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to individually shoulder the costs for such vital necessities as housing, retirement,
education, and, of course, health care.
Regarding health care, even for those fortunate enough to possess insurance, the
plans place "a good chunk of medical costs onto our own financial shoulders, in the
form of deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance, and employee-paid premiums." 42 In
addition, there are many policy limits and exclusions (e.g., physical and occupational
therapy), uncovered prescription costs, auxiliary aids, and lost income due to visits to
medical care providers. Moreover, "even modest deductibles and copays [can] pose
affordability problems, particularly if cost-sharing expenses recur, as for chronic
health conditions." 43 Given this dynamic, it should be no surprise that many
Americans are inundated with unaffordable medical bills. According to a study
conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, an estimated 33% of Americans report
having difficulties paying their medical bills. 4 4 As summarized by Lisa Servon:
Nearly one in five consumers has medical debt that has gone to a
collection agency for nonpayment. That medical debt makes up over
half of overdue debt mentioned on credit reports. Although some
consumers do owe tens of thousands of dollars, the average unpaid
medical debt in collections is $579. That may sound manageable, but
in fact almost half of Americans have to struggle to pay off a $400
emergency medical expense.
Even though most Americans possess health insurance, anecdotally among
bankruptcy professionals and empirically among bankruptcy law scholars, it is
largely unchallenged that medical debt is present in many personal bankruptcy
cases. 46 Lawmakers have taken note of this fact and have reacted with legislative

41 See HACKER, supra note 40, at
42

See id. at 37.

1-9.

43 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAL DEBT AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH
INSURANCE 7-8 (2014) [hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION] (discussing families 400% below the

federal poverty level).
44
See id. at 1 (regarding both short-term and long-term bill payments).
See SERVON, supra note 40, at 59.
46 See Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya R. Holman, FinancialFragility,Medical Problems, and the Bankruptcy
System, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 61 (2014); see also ELIZABETH
WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING
BROKE 81 (2003) (noting "[n]early nine out of ten families with children cite just three reasons for their
bankruptcies: job loss, family breakup, and medical problems"); Brian K. Bucks, Out of Balance? Financial
Distress in U.S. Households, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 60 (2012) ("Bankrupt
households are much more likely to have medical debt than any of the other groups of financially vulnerable
households."); KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 43, at 18 (noting "[m]edical bills are a leading cause
of personal bankruptcy in the U.S."); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY LAWRENCE

WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 173
(1989) [hereinafter AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS] (explaining while medical debt is not the "typical" cause
of bankruptcy, over half of debtors filing for bankruptcy experience some type of medical related debt in
addition to their "already over-burdened balance sheets . . .").
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efforts to ease the burden of bankruptcy on filers with significant amounts of medical
debt.
II. THE MEDICAL BANKRUPTCY FAIRNESS ACT

A common perception of medical bills is that they are unavoidable, no matter
how prudent the individual.4 " Accordingly, debtors who file for bankruptcy because
of medical debts are believed to be truly "honest but unfortunate."4 9 Current
bankruptcy law draws no distinction between debts accrued because of unavoidable
and unforeseeable medical costs (e.g., treatments for a child diagnosed with
leukemia)o and debts acquired through profligate spending" or reckless business
speculation.5 2 Accordingly, debtors who file bankruptcy because of medical debts are
subject to the same oversight intended to reign in the potential abuse of filers
generally.
Scholars have been largely critical of the law's attempts to reign in debtor abuse,
particularly through the means test introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"). 5 3 The means test establishes a
presumption of abuse in a chapter 7 filing for debtors whose current monthly income,
as defined by the Code, is higher than the median income for the same-sized
household in their geographic location, unless their monthly expenses, also defined
See, e.g., H.R. 5138, 110th Cong. (2008).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1084 (1998) (noting the
unavoidability of certain medical debts).
49 See AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 46, at 173 ("Medical debt arouses our sympathy because
illness is socially defined as something that is 'not the fault' of the sick or the injured.").
50 See Echo L. Warner, Anne C. Kirchhoff, Gina E. Nam & Mark Fluchel, FinancialBurden of Pediatric
Cancerfor Patients and Their Families, 11 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 12, 12 (2014) (noting the high financial
burden placed on families in need of cancer treatments). The average cost for hospitalization for leukemia
patients in 2009 was $55,700. See id.
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2012) (noting specific debts cannot be discharged, under the exception, by an
individual debtor in certain proceedings). If a creditor can prove that the debtor obtained credit under false
pretenses, then the debt may be deemed nondischargeable, although the Supreme Court has recently limited
the extent to which this exception to discharge applies. See Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S.
Ct. 1752, 1763-64 (2018) (holding a statement about a single asset canbe a "statement respecting the debtor's
financial condition" falling outside the category of nondischargeable debts) (internal quotations omitted).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (explaining dismissal is based primarily on consumer debts). In fact, business
debt is generally afforded greater leeway under the Code, as an individual with primarily business debts is not
subject to the means test. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts From the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, But PracticalIrrelevance, ofCulpability andAbility to Pay, 51 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 229, 255-57
(2001) [hereinafter Collecting Debts From the Ill andInjured] (noting the then-proposed means test fails to
distinguish or sort debtors based on culpability or the reasons they filed for bankruptcy).
53 See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
"BankruptcyAbuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of2005," 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 193 (2005)
(criticizing the use of the means test); see also Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?An
EmpiricalStudy of ConsumerDebtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008) (noting BAPCPA failed its mission);
Gary Neustadter, 2005: A Consumer Bankruptcy Odyssey, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 225, 354 (2005)
(emphasizing inefficiencies of the means test); David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The FailedBankruptcy
Revolution of2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007) (describing the means test as a mechanism
that encourages bankruptcy abuse).
4

48
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by the Code, reduce their disposable income to an acceptable level. 4 Debtors who do
not "pass" the means test cannot file for bankruptcy under chapter 7, but instead must
file, if at all, under chapter 13 or possibly under chapter 11 ." Data gathered since the
imposition of the means test has consistently demonstrated that it imposes additional
costs on filers; 6 there are no empirical conclusions that the means test is successful
at cracking down on abuse.
In recent years, legislators have sought to better accommodate so called
"medically-distressed debtors," and to shield them from some of the more stringent
provisions of the Code geared to combat alleged abuse, including those introduced
by BAPCPA. Introduced separately in both the House and the Senate, the Medical
Bankruptcy Fairness Act ("MBFA") has sought to define a category of medicallydistressed debtors to provide these debtors with greater protection.' The bill was first
introduced under that title in 2008 by Representative Carol Shea-Porter of New
Hampshire's First Congressional District.59 It afforded medically-distressed debtors a
larger exemption of real or personal property than other debtors, and also did not
require this category of debtor to undergo a means test analysis. 0 Under the MBFA
a medically-distressed debtor was defined to include those who incurred medical
expenses greater than 25% of the debtor's household income or $10,000, whichever
was smaller at the time of filing, as well as those living in a household where someone
lost substantially all of his or her income for a four-week period within a given year
due to a medical problem, whether the income be from employment or alimony. 6
After the bill died in committee, Representative Shea-Porter introduced a
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (detailing the means test).
See id. § 707(b)(1) (explaining when the court may dismiss or convert a chapter 7 case filed by an
individual debtor). Section 707(b)(1) of the Code provides in relevant part as follows:
5
5

[a]fter notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the

United States trustee, or any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtors
consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that
the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter ....
Id.
56See Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
17, 68 (2012) (discussing the increase in filing fees for chapter 7 cases filed pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA);
see also Carlson, supra note 53, at 318 (noting the means test is counter-productive or meaningless); Stephen
J. Spurr & Kevin M. Ball, The Effects of a Statute (BAPCPA) Designed to AMfake itAore Difficultfor People
to Filefor Bankruptcy, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 27, 31 (2013) (explaining BAPCPA increased paperwork and fees
involved in filing).
5 See Carlson, supra note 53, at 318.
51 See H.R. 5138, 110th Cong. (2008) (first introduction of MBFA); see also S. 1624, 111th Cong. (2009)
(second introduction of MBFA).
59 See H.R. 5138 (first introduction of MBFA) ("To amend title 11 of the United States Code to provide
protection for medical debt homeowners, to restore bankruptcy protections for individuals experiencing
economic distress as caregivers to ill or disabled family members, and to exempt from means testing debtors
whose financial problems were caused by serious medical problems.").
60 See id. (enumerating a new set of exemptions for those who qualify as medically-distressed
debtors).
61 See id. (explaining the qualifying debts must have been incurred during "any consecutive 12-month
period" within three years of the petition date).
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substantially similar bill in the next Congress.62 A few months later, Senator Sheldon
Whitehouse of Rhode Island introduced a bill under the same name (i.e., MBFA) that
largely incorporated the earlier bill's proposed amendments to the Code and included
an additional provision that would exempt medically-distressed debtors from
BAPCPA's credit counseling requirement. 63 The Senate Bill took a slightly different
approach in defining a medically-distressed debtor, first defining "medical debt" as
debt "incurred directly or indirectly as a result of the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of injury, deformity, or disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body." 6 4
Medically-distressed debtors were then defined as those who incurred medical
debts in excess of 10% of the debtor's adjusted gross income, as defined by the
Internal Revenue Service, or $10,000, whichever was smaller. 5 In addition, debtors
who had lost domestic support obligation income for four or more weeks within a
given year, or experienced a downgrade in employment status for at least thirty days
in a twelve-month period in order to care for an immediate family member, would
also be considered a medically-distressed debtor. 6 The bill would also make
attorneys' fees generated by a chapter 7 filing nondischargeable debts, which would
enable debtors who were unable to pay attorneys' fees at the time of filing to retain
legal counsel on the promise that the fees would be paid following the bankruptcy
discharge
In presenting his bill on the Senate floor, Senator Whitehouse described the
legislation as intended to "help families struggling with medical debts overcome
hurdles that under current law make it difficult for them to find relief in the
bankruptcy system."68 He cited a "recent Harvard University study," which
determined that "health care-related costs" had contributed "to over 62 percent of
filings in 2007."69 In addition, Senator Whitehouse described the cases of two
62 See H.R. 901, 111th Cong. (2009) (detailing exemptions were substantially the same as those in the initial
bill).
63 See generally S. 1624, 111th Cong. (2009) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) (2012)) (altering 11 U.S.C. §
109(h), which provides as a condition precedent for bankruptcy eligibility a consumer "may not be a debtor"
under the Code, unless the individual has received credit counseling from an approved agency within the sixmonth period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
6 Id. § 2.
65 Compare id. (defining medically-distressed debtors as incurring medical debts in excess
of 10% of the
debtor's adjusted gross income), with H.R. 901 § 2 (defining medically-distressed debtors as incurring medical
debts in excess of 25% of the debtor's household income).
66 See S. 1624
§ 2.
See id. § 6 (stating attorney's fees incurred by a debtor as a result of filing a petition under chapter 7 are
nondischargeable). Under current law, there is no special treatment for attorneys' fees in chapter 7, meaning
that any legal fees not paid prior to filing the bankruptcy petition will become dischargeable, unsecured debt.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). This naturally discourages attorneys from representing a debtor in a chapter 7 case
where they are not paid in advance, and has the secondary effect of directing many debtors to file chapter 13,
where attorneys' fees can be paid over time through a court-approved plan. See id. § 330 (giving the court
discretion to grant reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney for representing the interests of the debtor
in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case).
155 Cong. Rec. S9022 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse).
69 Id. (finding 62.l1% of all bankruptcies in 2007 were medical).
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constituents with staggering medical debt, accrued despite the fact that they had
health insurance.70 In one case, the health insurance policy hit a maximum limit, and
in the other, medical debt arose from the deductibles and co-pays associated with the
medical insurance. 7
This bill also died in committee. The hearings on the bill featured testimony from
experts who testified to the influential presence of medical debt in bankruptcy cases,
citing studies (described in further depth below) that suggested over 60% of all
bankruptcies are associated with medical indebtedness. 72 However, the committee
also heard from Aparna Mathur, who presented testimony contradicting this
assertion.73
In 2014, Senator Whitehouse reintroduced the MBFA, this time with the support
of Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts.7 4 This version of the bill allowed the
court to confirm a chapter 13 plan over the objection of an unsecured creditor for
medically-distressed debtors.7 5 By so doing, the bill permitted the confirmation of a
plan if: (1) the debtor failed to repay the objecting creditor's claim in full; and (2)
failed to dedicate all of the debtor's "projected disposable income" to unsecured
creditors.7 In addition, the bill permitted medically-distressed debtors to discharge
their student loans. Under current law, student loans are nondischargeable for all
debtors unless they can demonstrate that repayment of the loans "would impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.",7 This standard has been
informed by judicial interpretation, which sets an exceptionally high bar for
establishing "undue hardship," such as a "certainty of hopelessness" in terms of
repayment. 79 Not surprisingly, relatively few student loans are successfully

70 See id. (telling the story of a 23-year-old who had $20,000 in medical debt and
a veteran and retiree who
had to sell his home due to medical costs).
71 See id. (noting one individual's insurance policy had maxed out and the other individual was responsible
for paying a $2,000 deductible plus 20% of the costs of his medical care).
72 See, e.g., Medical Bankruptcy FairnessAct: Hearing on H.R. 901 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 88, 88 (2010) (statement of J. Cecelia G.
Morris, Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) ("It is well documented that around half of all bankruptcies are the result of a serious
medical problem.").
73 See id. at 96 (statement of Aparna Mathur) ("The statistics are simply not bome out by household surveys
carried out by institutions like the Federal Reserve as well as other datasets widely used by academics.").
See generally S. 2471, 113th Cong. (2014) (proposing to amend the Code on June 12, 2014).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2012) (detailing the court may approve the plan over an objection if the value
to be distributed under the plan is less than the amount of the claim or if all of the debtor's projected disposable
income will be applied to payments under the plan).
76 See id. ("[T]he plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the
applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied
to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.").
See S. 2471 § 6.
78 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
79 See In re Murphy, 305 B.R. 780, 792 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) ("Each undue hardship discharge must rest
on its own facts, but dischargeability of student loans should be based on a 'certainty of hopelessness.' In order
to discharge a student loan, a debtor must show that unique or extraordinary circumstances which created the
hardship render it unlikely that the debtor will ever be able to honor her obligations.") (internal citations
omitted).
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discharged in bankruptcy.o Nonetheless, permitting the discharge of student loans
outright, without requiring debtors to prove undue hardship, would be an enormous
benefit to many debtors, especially for those also plagued by medical debts. Within
the same week, Representative Shea-Porter introduced a substantially identical bill in
the House.8 ' Again, both bills died in committee.
In 2016, Senators Whitehouse and Warren were joined by Senator Dick Durbin
of Illinois in introducing the MBFA to the 114th Congress.82 There were no
substantive amendments from the 2014 version. 8 3 In a statement on the bill, Senator
Whitehouse noted that "the current bankruptcy process offers no acknowledgement
that, unlike other debts, medical bills often cannot be avoided.""4 Senator Durbin
expressed the hope that the bill would "provide important safeguards for those
bankrupted by medical issues outside of their control." 5 Clearly, the goal was to
provide relief for individuals whose health issues had become overwhelming
financial issues, with the underlying notion that such individuals could not have
anticipated or prevented their predicaments. 6 It was implied in the discussion that
medical debts are a significant problem for a large proportion of bankruptcy filers.
However, this view is not as well established as some have argued, as evidenced by
the conflicting testimony on the topic to Congress.
Although there are multiple studies linking bankruptcy to medical costs, scholars
do not agree to the extent medical issues lead to bankruptcy or the number of
bankruptcies that are linked to medical debt. As discussed in greater depth below,
this lack of consensus stems in part from significant disagreement between studies
on how to measure and even how to define medical debt. From the perspective of
those seeking to pass legislation protecting medical debtors, the stakes are high: if
debtors do not file as a consequence of medical bills, it becomes much harder to
justify offering them special treatment not afforded to those that do not file for
bankruptcy protection. 7 On the other hand, if a significant percentage of all debtors
do file because of overwhelming medical debts, perhaps the protections afforded by
so See Jason luliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship
Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 505, 523 (2012) (suggesting student loans may be infrequently discharged
inpart because of the widespread conception that the undue hardship standard is difficult to meet).
See generally H.R. 4917, 113th Cong. (2014) (proposing to amend the Code on June 19, 2014).
82 See generally S. 3385, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposing to amend the Code on Sept. 22, 2016).
83 Compare id, with H.R. 4917, 113th Cong. (2014).
4See Press Release, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Whitehouse, Warren, Durbin Introduce Medical Bankruptcy
Fairness Act (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/whitehouse-warren-durbinintroduce-medical-bankruptcy-fairness-act- (adding "[MBFA] would give families burdened by medical debt
the opportunity to get a fresh financial start").
85 Id. (emphasizing "[n]obody should ever have to choose between their physical health and their financial
health, yet far too many Americans are driven into bankruptcy when they or their loved ones are ill").
86 Id. (highlighting Sen. Durbin's statement: "I'm pleased to join my colleagues in introducing this [MBFA]
bill, which would provide important safeguards for those bankrupted by medical issues outside of their
control").
87 See Amy Y. Landry & Robert J. Landry, III, Medical Bankruptcy Reform: A Fallacy of Composition, 19
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151, 151-52 (2011) ("The debates [over links between bankruptcy and medical
costs] often turn into bipolar debates that pit consumer-oriented advocates and business-oriented groups
against each other, with each casting blame on the other.").
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MBFA should be extended to all filers, bypassing the need for additional proof of
eligibility or the need to pass a means test.
Rather than jumping into the fray over the specific problem of the prevalence of
medical debt in bankruptcy court, this Article adopts a different perspective by
examining the predictive relationship between possessing health insurance and
subsequently filing for bankruptcy. While the MBFA would benefit medicallydistressed debtors (however defined) once they declare bankruptcy, it does not
address one of the possible root causes for the accrual of overwhelming medical debt
in the first place, namely, the lack of adequate health insurance coverage." That is,
the MBFA, should it ever be passed by Congress, would only provide assistance to
individuals after they have already been forced into bankruptcy; for many, this may
prove to be too little, too late to be truly meaningful.89 Recent empirical evidence
demonstrates that most debtors struggle with their debts for more than two years
before filing for bankruptcy, during which time they frequently drain retirement
accounts, encumber real and personal property to pay for otherwise unsecured debts,
and undermine their financial position in other ways that cannot be undone in
bankruptcy proceedings. 90
Past congressional efforts focusing on debtors once they file for bankruptcy is
laudable, but we believe the better inquiry should be on ways to prevent the
accumulation of medically-related debt in the first instance. Almost by default, such
an inquiry must concentrate upon the possession of health insurance, perhaps the
single best way to prevent the accrual of overwhelming medical debt. Consequently,
we contend that instead of concentrating on whether (and in what percentages)
medical bills cause bankruptcy or how to smooth the bankruptcy process for those
with primarily medical debt, greater attention should be placed on the relationship
between health insurance and consumer bankruptcy filings. This Article adds to the
developing literature teasing out the connection between health insurance and
consumer bankruptcy. More specifically, this Article attempts to address the
predictive effect of a bankruptcy filing based upon the possession of health insurance.
The following section addresses the existing scholarly literature in the field before
reporting on our methodology and findings in Part IV.
III. MEDICAL DEBT, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

A. Studies Focusingon the Prevalence ofMedical Debt in Bankruptcy
Although not the approach we take in this Article, the inquiry of whether and to
what extent medical debt results in bankruptcy is valuable to an understanding of the

88 See generally S. 3385, 114th Cong. (2016).
89 See id.
90

See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, Life in the Sweatbox, 94

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219, 220-21 (2018) (finding most people struggle for two years in the "sweatbox"

before filing for bankruptcy).
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social problem. Solutions attempting to mitigate the harmful effects of medical
expenses are only rational if medical expenses are in fact causing harm. For this
reason, the focus on the amount of a debtor's medical debt, as in the MBFA, has been
at the center of the bankruptcy law literature beginning in the 1960s. Scholars have
looked not only at how much medical debt individuals bring into bankruptcy, but also
whether it can be determined that medical debt had influenced the decision to file for
bankruptcy. 91
David T. Stanley and Marjorie Girth first examined the relationship between
bankruptcy and medical debt by conducting an empirical study that randomly
sampled bankruptcy cases filed in 1964 from eight federal judicial districts across the
country "to reflect variations in geography, population, the economy of the area, type
and volume of bankruptcy caseload, relative costs of bankruptcy proceedings, and
extent to which rehabilitative proceedings were used."9 2 Stanley and Girth
interviewed 400 consumer debtors approximately two years after their bankruptcy
cases closed to ask debtors about the underlying financial problems leading to their
bankruptcy filings. 93 Although the leading reported cause of financial problems
articulated by the participants (3 1%) was "poor debt management-too many debts,
unwise re-financing, [and] overspending,"9 4 28% of individuals reported "family
health reasons" (i.e., sickness, injuries, babies, and death) as the second most
significant underlying cause for their need to file for bankruptcy protection. 9 5
In the early 1980s, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence
Westbrook established the CBP, which in 1981 involved a random sampling of 1,529
consumer bankruptcy cases drawn across judicial districts in three states: Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. 96 Among other foci of study, Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook examined the relationship between medical debt and bankruptcy. On this
topic, the authors concluded that "crushing medical debt is not the widespread
bankruptcy phenomenon that many have supposed."9 7 Only a few debtors had what
could be described as "insurmountable medical debts," with the more typical scenario
being that debtors would "add medical debt to their already overburdened balance
sheets, and, at some point, they finally tumble over into bankruptcy." 98 In sum, the
authors argued that "[a]lthough these medical debts are not the obvious cause of the
debtors' bankruptcies, they are part of their financial troubles." 99 Sullivan, Warren,
91 See Landry & Landry, supra note 87, at 162-64 (discussing the extent of the influence of medical debt on
the decision to file for bankruptcy).
92 STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 5, at 6 7 (explaining the method of study used).
93 Id. at 7-8 (explaining a supplemental study to receive additional data).
94 Id. at 41, 47 (discussing the individuals in the study and the leading reason the debtors went to bankruptcy
court).
95 Id. at 47 (stating family health reasons are the second leading cause for bankruptcy filings).
96 See As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 46, at 18 (discussing the states involved and the study
and the reasons for selecting those states).
97 See id. at 173 (concluding "crushing medical debt" is not as common of a reason for bankruptcy filings as
once thought).
98 Id. (stating medical debt is part of the financial struggles for people in bankruptcy).

99 Id.
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and Westbrook also found that about half of all debtors carried some medical debt, a
finding consistent with Philip Shuchman's 1983 sampling of 753 chapter 7
bankruptcy cases from nine judicial districts across the country for the years 1979,
1980, and 1981.100 Examining debtors' bankruptcy schedules, Shuchman concluded
that 56% of the debtors sampled had some form of medical debt, with the average
amount being $1,878 ($5,364 in 2018 dollars).' 0' Shuchman further found that
medical debt represented approximately 12% of all unsecured debt.1 02 In 1991, Susan
Kovacs conducted her own study using a sampling of 247 chapter 7 bankruptcy cases
filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee from
July 1, 1985 through June 1, 1986.103 Kovacs found that 80% of debtors in her study
owed some medical debt, with a mean total of $7,827, and that medical debt
represented 42% of total unsecured debt.' 0 4 Based on these numbers, Kovacs
concluded that the "driving force" behind the bankruptcy filings was medical debt. 05
In 2000, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook published the results of the second
iteration of the CBP that reported a larger role for medical debt in causing
bankruptcy.' 06 According to the researchers, 20% of the debtors in the sample "listed
a medically related problem as a reason for their bankruptcy filing, making it the third
most common reason listed, after job loss and family problems." 0 7 The explanation
for the medical problems broke down into several categories, namely: (1) medical
debts; (2) problems with health insurance; (3) income effects of illness; (4) injury or
disability; and (5) an unspecified justification. 08 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
noted that individuals frequently will pay for medical treatment on credit cards,
through a home equity line of credit, or through a finance company loan, making it
difficult to identify scheduled debt as explicitly medical. 109 They further suggested
that debtors may neglect to list medical providers as an unsecured debt on their
100 See Philip Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 PersonalBankruptcy
Filings in Nine States, 88 COM. L.J. 288, 288 (1983).
101 See id. at 295 (analyzing the complete information of chapter 7 filings from nine jurisdictions and finding
421 out of 753 cases had scheduled medical debt).
102 See id. at 295-96 (referring to Table 0, the average medical debt of the 421 cases was $1,878).
103 See Susan D. Kovac, Judgment-ProofDebtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675, 676 (1991)
(examining a sample of 247 chapter 7 filings by "judgement-proof" debtors over the course of one year in a
single bankruptcy court in order to determine the extent such debtors are represented in the bankruptcy
population, the nature of their debts, and the actual advantages or disadvantages they might receive by filing
for bankruptcy relief at a time when their income and assets are already exempt from attachment) (internal
quotations omitted).
104 See id. at 712-13 (alluding to Table G, which highlights medical debt was found in the author's sample
of judgement-proof debtors to have constituted 42% of total unsecured debt and that 197 of the 247 sampled
debtors reported some form of medical debt).
105 Id. at 709 (highlighting 80% of the sampled debtors owed some medical debt, the author concluded
medical debt has an overwhelming impact on judgement-proof debtors).
106 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 141 (basing the economic impact of sickness and injury on the
cost of medical care and the loss of income that arises from illness and accidents).
10 7
Id. at 142 (citing their finding that one household in five in their sample listed a medically related problem
as a reason for their bankruptcy filing).
10 See id. at 144.
109 See id. at 153 (enumerating the ways in which paying for medical bills can conceal the fact that such bills
can actually constitute "medical debt").
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bankruptcy petition out of a moral obligation to not see the debt officially discharged,
or so as not to tarnish a personal relationship with the treatment provider. " 0
In an effort to better pinpoint the nature of the relationship between medical debt
and bankruptcy, Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan, and Elizabeth Warren used
data from Phase III of the CBP in which sampled respondents were asked "to identify
the family's reasons for filing bankruptcy.""' Respondents were provided a choice of
sixteen possible responses, including "illness or injury of self or family member."112
Jacoby, Sullivan, and Warren also questioned respondents whether they owed any
money to certain types of creditors, including "health care providers, services,
supplies,"" 3 and whether they had medical bills not covered by insurance in excess
of $1,000 during the past two years." 4 Nearly half of the sample identified a medical
reason for their bankruptcy, or identified at least $1,000 in health related bills (46.2%,
combined)." 5 The authors pointed out the apparent anomaly of this percentage
despite the fact that 80% of the debtors in the study possessed some form of health
116
insurance.
The conversation, while still focused on medical debt, became increasingly
relevant to discussions of health insurance as government bodies contemplated
possible legislative approaches to improving access to affordable medical care.
Perhaps the most well-known and controversial study regarding medical debt and
bankruptcy was issued in 2005 by David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah
Thorne, and Steffie Woolhandler." 7 In this study, Himmelstein et al. utilized data
from the 2001 iteration of the CBP, a cluster sampling of 1,771 households filing for
bankruptcy in 2001 across five judicial districts,"" "to estimate how frequently illness
and medical bills contributed to bankruptcy."l 9 Himmelstein and colleagues defined
two summary measures of medical bankruptcy, as follows:
110

See id. (suggesting "other debtors may find health care providers to be their most aggressive creditors").
ill Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 (2001) [hereinafter Rethinking the Debates] (discussing the
need for multiple perspectives "in light of the various results previously reported").
112 Id. at 387 (stating one in four families selected this option as a cause for their bankruptcy).
113 Id. (stating one in three families reported having this type of bill).
114 See id. at 389 (explaining bills included any obligation incurred for medical treatment like another
mortgage).
115 See id. (discussing substantial impact of sum because
of debtor's low annual income). In a prior study,
Jacoby utilized data from the 1999 CBP to focus exclusively on chapter 13 debtors and similarly found 46.2%
of the sample identified as "medical-related bankruptcies." See Collecting Debts From the Ill and Injured,
supra note 52, at 236 (defining "medical-related bankruptcies" as including illness, injury, or other substantial
medical debt).
116
See Rethinking the Debates, supra note 111, at 401 (suggesting more health insurance led to more medical
debt); see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond HospitalMisbehavior:AnAlternativeAccount
of Aedical-Related FinancialDistress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 535, 548 (2006) (citing Phase III of CBP in
reorting that 27% of sampled debtors identified a medical cause for their bankruptcy).
17 See Illness and Injury as Contributorsto Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at W5-63 (discussing the need for
more comprehensive universal coverage to address medical bankruptcies).
11s See id. at W5-64 (stating the need for study because "[t]he health policy literature is virtually silent on
bankruptcy").
1 19
Id. at W5-65.
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[u]nder the rubric "Major Medical Bankruptcy" we included debtors
who either (1) cited illness or injury as a specific reason for
bankruptcy, or (2) reported uncovered medical bills exceeding
$1,000 in the past years, or (3) lost at least two weeks of work-related
income because of illness/injury, or (4) mortgaged a home to pay
medical bills.
Our more inclusive category, "Any Medical
Bankruptcy," included debtors who cited any of the above, or
addiction, or uncontrolled gambling, or birth, or the death of a family
member. 120
Based on their data, Himmelstein and colleagues found that 46.2% of debtors met
at least one of the criteria for a "Major Medical Bankruptcy" and 54.5% met the
criteria for "Any Medical Bankruptcy."'21 Clearly, the argument followed, medical
issues were a primary driver of bankruptcy, thereby justifying a comprehensive
adjustment to the health insurance model.
The 2005 Himmelstein et al. study received swift and sharp criticism, which
continues to this day.1 2 2 The thrust of the criticism is two-fold: first, the researchers'
methodological decisions to define expansively the contours of a "major medical
cause" and "medical cause" of a bankruptcy filing, and second, their reliance upon
self-reporting by individuals already in bankruptcy. As to the first point, regarding
the definition of "medical causes," Gail Heriot argued that Himmelstein and
colleagues structured their definitions intentionally to make these categories "seem
as large as possible." 23 Looking at the data more conservatively, Heriot asserted that
"only 28.3% of all debtors questioned for the study cited illness or injury as a reason
for their own bankruptcies, and even that figure is bloated.", 24 Similarly, in
reexamining the CBP data, David Dranove and Michael Millenson argued that
Himmelstein and colleagues failed to provide "a causal relationship to support the
claim that medical spending contributes to 'half of all bankruptcies."'l 2 5 Instead,
Dranove and Millenson argued that at best, Himmelstein and colleagues "show that
medical bills are a cause of 17 percent of bankruptcies but are not necessarily the
most important cause. "1126 In casting doubt on the conclusions of the 2005
Id.
See id. at W5-66.
122 See generally Gail L. Heriot, Misdiagnosis: A Comment on Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy and the Media Publicity Surrounding It, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 229 (2005); David Dranove
Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH AFF. W74 (2006); Carlos Dobkin
et al., Myth and Measurement The Case of Aedical Bankruptcies, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1076 (2018).
These initial critiques garnered a response by Himmelstein and his fellow researchers. See generally David U.
Himmelstein et al., DiscountingThe Debtors Will NotA fake Aedical Bankruptcy Disappear,25 HEALTH AFF.
W84 (2006) [hereinafter Discounting The Debtors].
123 Heriot, supra note 122, at 241.
12 4
Id. at 236.
125 Dranove & Millenson, supra note 122, at W75 (internal citations omitted).
120

&

121

126 Id.
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Himmelstein et al. study, Dranove and Millenson also pointed to other studies that
had found little or no correlation between medical debt and bankruptcy.1 27
Separately, other researchers reached very different conclusions regarding the
prevalence of medical bankruptcies. Aparna Mathur, who testified before Congress
regarding the MBFA, conducted a study that used PSID data from 1996 to estimate
that only 27% of consumer bankruptcy filings are induced by high levels of medical
debt.1 28 In 2014, Daniel Austin gathered data on medical debt by examining
bankruptcy schedules and conducting surveys of debtors regarding their reasons for
filing bankruptcy.1 29 Austin counted medical debt as the predominant causal factor
for a bankruptcy only if it constituted a majority of a debtor's total unsecured debt,
constituted more than half of the debtor's annual income, or was identified by the
debtor his- or herself as the primary reason for filing. 3 0 His study concluded that
while medical debt is the single largest cause of consumer bankruptcy, it is the
predominant causal factor in only 18-26% of all consumer bankruptcies.' 3
Himmelstein and colleagues strenuously rejected the Dranove and Millenson
critiques. 3 2 Furthermore, in 2009, Himmelstein et al. published another study using
CBP data with substantially similar criteria as used in their 2005 study.' 33 This
updated study concluded that 62.1% of all bankruptcies have a medical cause.13 4
Recognizing the need to allow for inflationary pressure on the $1,000 figure used in
their previous study for outstanding medical bills or medical debt amounting to at
least 10% of household income, the authors reported that using a more conservative
$5,000 figure reduced the percentage of medical bankruptcies by about seven
percentage points.135
Much of the disagreement among scholars over the extent to which medical debt
contributes to bankruptcies comes down to a disagreement regarding what constitutes
medical debt. For the reasons noted by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook,1 36
estimating the financial burden of medical debt may be difficult or impossible to do
based solely on a debtor's bankruptcy schedules, simply because individuals tend to
pay for medical expenses using credit cards or other forms of debt, and thus true
medical debt would be masked on the bankruptcy petition and accompanying
See generally id. (internal citations omitted).
See Apama Mathur, Medical Bills and Bankruptcy Filings, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., 1, 19 (2010),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228336696_MedicalBillsandBankruptcy Filings (citing a study
estimating the percent of bankruptcy filings caused primarily by medical debt).
129 See Daniel A. Austin, Medical Debt as a Cause of Consumer Bankruptcy, 67 ME. L. REV. 1, 15 (2014)
(describing the sources of data and methodology used).
130 See id. at 14.
131 See id. at 2.
132 See Discounting The Debtors, supra note 122, at W84 (alleging Dranove and Millenson ignored and
misrepresented data to skew statistics on medical debt resulting in bankruptcies).
133 See generally David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a
NationalStudy, 122 AM. J. MED. 741 (2009) [hereinafter Medical Bankruptcy in the United States].
134 See id. at A10.
135 See id. at
742.
136 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 153 (emphasizing concealment of medical debt in bankruptcy
filings on credit card debts, home equity lines of credit, and finance company loans).
127

128
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schedules by amounts owed to a credit card, family member, or another lender.13 7
Certainly, researchers have corroborated earlier findings that debtors generally bring
relatively small levels of medical debt per se into bankruptcy proceedings, and
catastrophic medical expenses are relatively rare. 38 For example, in a 2010 study,
Jacoby and Holman confronted the discrepancy between individuals who had
reported medical bills as a motivating cause and the modest amount of observable
medical debt within their bankruptcy filings. 3 9 They acknowledged that "one out of
four respondents who explicitly reported medical bills as a reason for filing for
bankruptcy has court records with zero identifiable medical debt," and that many
others had only small amounts of identifiable medical debt.1 40 However, these
respondents also reported significantly higher credit card debt and mortgage use,
suggesting that they had essentially exchanged one type of debt for another, namely,
paying their medical bills using credit cards or by mortgaging their homes.' 4 ' Other
studies have reinforced these findings, reaching similar conclusions regarding bill
management among bankruptcy filers.1 4 2 This makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for researchers to rely simply on the amount of identifiable medical debt on debtors'
bankruptcy schedules as an indication of the prevalence of such debt among
bankruptcy filers nationwide.
Furthermore, debt associated with illness may spread beyond the costs of doctors,
medicine, treatments, or hospitalization, and there is no agreement on where to draw
the line on costs that are deemed "medical." Lost work-related income due to an
illness or injury, for example, is not a medical bill nor the cause of medical bills, but
would undoubtedly have an impact upon a debtor's ability to pay outstanding medical
bills, not to mention all other household expenses. Despite this relationship, Heriot
argued that the reporting of lost work due to illness or injury may have been
systematically overstated by the participants in the Himmelstein et al. study, resulting
137 See id. ("In addition to the problem of identification, where medical debt is camouflaged within another
category, especially the ubiquitous credit cards category, it is possible that medical debt, like the 'last credit
card,' is often omitted from the debt schedules.").
138 See Dranove & Millenson, supra note 122, at W74, W78 (reporting 90% of consumer bankruptcy filers
within their study reported medical debt of less than $5,000); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Individual Health
InsuranceMandates and FinancialDistress: A Few Notes from the Debtor-CreditorResearch and Debates,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (2007) [hereinafter IndividualHealth Insurance Mandates and Financial
Distress] ("Federal Reserve researchers looking at a nationally representative sample of credit reports from
the late 1990s found that 36.5% of the notations for medical bills were for $100 or less and that 70% were for
$250 or less.").
139 See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, AanagingAedical Bills on the Brink ofBankruptcy,
10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 239, 286 (2010) [hereinafter Aanaging Aedical Bills]
("[D]emonstrat[ing] through detailed systematic analysis that the DOJ's court record method, standing alone,
is an unreliable measure of the financial burden of illness or injury faced by bankruptcy filers.").
140
Id. at 242.
141 See id. at 242-43 ("[R]espondents who specifically cited medical bills as a reason for filing for
bankruptcy mortgaged their homes to pay medical bills at nearlyfour times the frequency of other filers. They
also were more than a third more likely that other filers to use credit cards for medical bills.").
142 See Cindy Zeldin & Mark Rukavina, Borrowing to Stay Healthy: How Credit CardDebt is Related to
Aedical Expenses, DEMOS 1 (2005) (finding 29% of individuals surveyed reported medical expenses
contributed to their current level of credit card debt).
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in a skewing of the data in this regard.1 43 Similarly, Heriot noted that the birth of a
new family member may introduce financial stress on a family, but it is hard to say
conclusively that medical bills caused the financial stress. As Heriot observed,
"[b]abies are a financial hardship even when hospitals give them away free."' 44
In short, defining the parameters of what constitutes medical debt or indebtedness
caused by medical issues can be problematic, and researchers have not agreed upon
a precise limitation to guide empirical studies. Consequently, and with the prevalence
of health insurance as a matter of national economic policy, some scholars have
moved their attention away from medical debt as a cause of consumer bankruptcy to
the question over the relationship between health insurance and financial distress.
B. Studies Examining the Relationship Between Health Insurance and Financial
Distress
Most Americans defray the risk of serious medical issues by obtaining health
insurance, paying a monthly premium in exchange for the promise of future
assistance with medical bills, such as those associated with doctors' visits,
prescription costs, or a hospitalization. Among those with insurance, most receive it
through an employer,1 4 5 with a minority obtaining their insurance from public
programs such as Medicaid 4 6 or Medicare.

47

There are, unfortunately, still a

substantial number of Americans without any health insurance.
Research regarding the effect of medical insurance on bankruptcy filing rates
gained greater relevance during the Obama Administration with the passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "ACA").1 49 The ACA was passed in
143 See Heriot, supra note 122, at 239-40 (noting the questionnaire used in the 2005 study invited debtors to
check all applicable answers as to why they lost work).
144 Id. at 234 (acknowledging new parents' difficulty adjusting from their previous lifestyles after a child is
born when one parent is required to stay home with the child).
145 See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population,KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, https://www.k
ff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%
22%7D (last visited May 14, 2019).
141 See Aedicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2019). Medicaid is a federal health coverage program administered by the states to benefit children, pregnant
women, elderly adults and people with disabilities. See id. Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, coverage
under Medicaid has been expanded in some states to cover eligible low-income adults. See Christina M.
Andrews, The Relationship of State Aedicaid Coverage to Aedicaid Acceptance Among Substance Abuse
Providers in the United States, 41 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 460, 462 (2014) (noting Medicaid's
expansion under the Affordable Care Act to all individuals with incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty
line).
147 See What is Aedicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/decide-howto-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (explaining Medicare is a
federal health insurance program for people who are 65 or older, and certain people with disabilities or extreme
medical conditions).

14s

See Key Facts about the UninsuredPopulation, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, https://www.kff.org/un

insured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/
approximately 27.4 million uninsured Americans in 2017).
See 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
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large part because of the view that universal insurance coverage would reduce the
financial strain on individuals and consequently the need for bankruptcy
protection.15 0 However, studies thus far have proved to be inconclusive and even
contradictory on whether having health insurance reduces the need for families to
resort to bankruptcy.
In 2011, just prior to the enactment of the ACA, Tal Gross and Matthew
Notowidigdo published a study that suggests an expansion of public health insurance
could significantly reduce consumer bankruptcy filing rates.' 5 The study examined
the relationship between Medicaid expansion and rates of consumer bankruptcy using
public health insurance data from the 1992-2004 Current Population Survey and the
bankruptcy filing rates published by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. 52 The
authors found that while consumer bankruptcy filings generally increased during the
1990s, the rate of increase was slower in states with larger expansions of Medicaid
benefits, with the relative reduction in personal bankruptcies concentrated most
strongly in households with children and in zip codes with low-income households. 153
In all, they concluded from their statistical models that "a 10 percentage-point
increase in eligibility for Medicaid reduces personal bankruptcies by 8%."54
Although the study is limited in its predictive value by virtue of the data it uses (now
two decades old) and its use of aggregate-level data (because of the ecological
fallacy), it supports the argument that expanded public health insurance could reduce
bankruptcies related to medical issues. 5 5
On the other hand, in the same year as the Gross and Notowidigdo study,
Himmelstein, Thorne, and Woolhandler published a study of Massachusetts
bankruptcy filing rates following the state's passage of health care reform, which
concluded that the number of bankruptcies caused by medical issues had not
decreased as a result of the reform. 156 By way of background, in 2006 Massachusetts
launched a health reform initiative that "expanded its Medicaid program, created a
new subsidized program through a health insurance exchange, instituted insurance
market reforms," and required individuals to purchase health insurance if they were

See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009)
(transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barackobama-address-joint-session-congress) (explaining the rise in insurance premiums correlates to the frequency
of bankruptcy filings).
151 See Gross & Notowidigdo, supra note
6, at 767.
152 See id. at 769 ("Our investigation into bankruptcy and public health insurance requires accurate measures
of both variables.").
153 See id. at 768 (finding Medicaid expansions disproportionately reduced bankruptcies in zip codes with a
lar e share of low-income households).
Id. at 767.
155 See id. (finding states with larger expansions of Medicaid eligibility experienced lower consumer
bankruptcy filing rates).
156 See Medical Bankruptcy in Massachusetts, supra note 5, at 227 ("However, our findings are incompatible
with claims that health reform has cut medical bankruptcy filings significantly.").
150
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not otherwise covered. ' 7 By 2008, the state had nearly universal insurance
coverage." Despite the success in expanding health insurance coverage, according
to the Himmelstein, Thorne, and Woolhandler study, there was no corresponding
success in reducing the need for bankruptcy.15 9 Methodologically, Himmelstein and
colleagues surveyed random samples of Massachusetts bankruptcy filers in 2009.160
They found that roughly half of the surveyed filers reported that illness or medical
bills contributed to their decision to file for bankruptcy, but of this group, nearly 99%
had health insurance for themselves and all dependents at the time they filed.' 6
Himmelstein and colleagues concluded that their findings were "incompatible with
claims that health reform has cut medical bankruptcy filings significantly[,]"1 62 and
theorized that this was due to the fact that "[h]igh premium costs and gaps in
coverage-copayments, deductibles, and uncovered services-often left insured
families liable

for substantial out-of-pocket

costs."1 63 These

findings were

particularly disheartening for those who promoted the ACA as a method to reduce
bankruptcy filings nationwide, as the ACA reforms were largely modeled after those
successfully implemented in Massachusetts. 64
Concentrating again on the State of Massachusetts, in a study published in 2016
Bhashkar Mazumder and Sarah Miller analyzed the effect of health insurance
coverage on various financial outcomes by mining data from individual-level credit
reports both before and after the expansion of public health insurance in the state. 65
Mazumder and Miller sought to determine whether expanded health insurance
See Michael T. Doonan & Katharine R. Tull, Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: Implementation of
CoverageExpansions and a Health InsuranceMandate, 88 MLBANK Q. 54, 55-56 (2010) (summarizing the
health reform initiative in Massachusetts).
15s See Sharon K. Long, Allison Cook & Karen Stockley, Health Insurance Coverage in Massachusetts:
Estimates from the 2008 Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey, MASS. DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FIN.
AND POLY 1 (2009), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32276/411815-Health-InsuranceCoverage-in-Massachusetts.pdf (showing only 2.6% of the state's population was uninsured in 2008).
159 See Medical Bankruptcy in Massachusetts, supra note 5, at 227 (noting the number of medical
bankruptcies has increased by one third).
"' See id. at 224 (relying on information gathered from questionnaires mailed to debtors immediately after
their bankruptcy filing and publicly available court records).
See id. at 226 (explaining even though the majority of debtors in the sample had health insurance at the
time of their filing, "45.6% . . . had high medical bills or specifically cited illness as a cause of their
bankruptcy").
162 Id. at
227.
163 Id. at 227. See Individual Health InsuranceMandates and FinancialDistress, supra note 138, at 1251
(holding empirical evidence suggests just being insured does not protect individuals from the financial risk of
medical problems).
164 See Sharon K. Long & Karen Stockley, Sustaining Health Reform In A Recession: An Update On
MassachusettsAs Of Fall 2009, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1234, 1234 (2010) (explaining the ACA reforms were
modeled on Massachusetts health reforms because of the parallels between both the national and
Massachusetts health initiatives). There was some testimony presented to Congress suggesting that the
Massachusetts model would continue to leave holes in medical insurance coverage. See Hearing on Medical
Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans? Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
AdministrativeLaw Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 20 (2009) (testimony of Steffie Woolhandler, M.D.,
M.P.H., Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School).
165 See Mazumder & Miller, supra note 6, at 296 (stating individual credit reports were observed from 1999
to 2012).
157
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coverage effected individuals along several financial variables, including total
amount of past due debt, the amount of third-party debt in collections associated with
an account, and the presence of a bankruptcy filing in the past twenty-four months. 66
With respect to personal bankruptcy, Mazumder and Miller found that a one
percentage point increase in the potential effect of health insurance reform (i.e.,
increased overall coverage) "is associated with a significant reduction in the
probability of having a bankruptcy of about 0.03 percentage points." 67 In other
words, increased insurance coverage across the population in Massachusetts
suggested a slight reduction in the probability of future bankruptcy filings. However,
a nationwide expansion of this study by Mazumder and Miller seeking to examine
the effect of the ACA on financial well-being found that the national expansion of
2014 did not have a significant effect on the probability of filing for bankruptcy. 68
At present then, the empirical evidence is inconclusive on the relationship
between possessing health insurance and filing for bankruptcy. The research question
undergirding this relationship, if any, is made all the more difficult based upon the
various types of insurance plans available in the United States (including publiclyprovided health insurance) along with the various coverage limitations, exclusions
and other policy-specific provisions. Admittedly, possessing a basic health insurance
policy does not necessarily protect an individual or an entire family from the financial
consequences of needed and uncovered or unreimbursed medical expenses.169
Nonetheless, if the presence or absence of health insurance is predictive of a future
bankruptcy filing, then perhaps federal legislators and health care policymakers need
to re-examine the expanse of health insurance coverage in the United States, if the
goal is to reduce the number of individuals and families filing for bankruptcy each
year. 170
Our study adds to the growing literature on health insurance and consumer
bankruptcy in two important ways. First, we utilize a randomly sampled, nationallyrepresentative, longitudinal data set to explore the relationship between possessing
66 See id. (discussing the study also analyzed the effect of the reform on individual "risk scores," which is
a credit score that ranges from 280-850).
1 Id. at 305 (highlighting results are from estimates of the effect of the reform on bankruptcy in the last 24
months).
1s See Luojia Hu et al., supra note 6, at 106 (noting the study sought to capture the overall change in financial
outcomes among the sample of adults with a credit report living in their target zip codes). In a somewhat
related study, Donald D. Hackney, Daniel Friesner, and Erica H. Johnson found that the ACA impacted the
presence and distribution of medical debts in bankruptcy. See Hackney et al., supra note 6, at 1969.
Specifically, the authors found that post-ACA chapter 13 debtors were more likely to report medical debts on
their bankruptcy schedules than chapter 7 filers prior to the ACA, suggesting that in the aftermath of the ACA
consumers who were plagued by medical debt were choosing to file for chapter 13 as opposed to chapter 7.
See id.
169 See Rethinking the Debates, supra note 111, at 399 ("The data demonstrate that having a basic health
insurance policy does not necessarily protect these families from being crushed by the financial consequences
of an illness or accident.").
170 See Yarbrough & Landry, supra note 6, at 674 (arguing that a more "aggressive Medicaid program might
alleviate some of these burdens from the working poor or low-income citizens in need and result in fewer
consumer bankruptcy filings").
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health insurance coverage and a future consumer bankruptcy. Second, we strive to
determine whether the type of insurance coverage possessed by an individual makes
a difference regarding a future bankruptcy filing. This second piece has been largely
ignored by previous studies, and our preliminary results suggest that future studies in
this realm would be particularly valuable.
IV. METHODS, DATA AND ANALYSIS

As noted at the outset, studying bankruptcy debtors on either an aggregate or
individual-level basis has historically been a challenge for researchers since so few
large-scale data sets inquire about bankruptcy filings.' 7 ' While bankruptcy petitions
themselves are court documents that are publicly available and have been used by
researchers to study certain elements of the consumer bankruptcy system, the
financial and personal information debtors must disclose on their bankruptcy
petitions are insufficient to study discrete, granular issues such as medical debt and
insurance coverage.1 7 2 Even more problematic, court documents can only be used to
study those who have filed for bankruptcy, and not to identify patterns distinguishing
those who file for bankruptcy from the larger population.
To assess whether health insurance coverage impacts the likelihood of filing for
bankruptcy, we use data from the NLSY79, collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.1 73 The NLSY79 consists of a nationally representative sample of 12,686
young men and women aged 14-22 at the time when they were initially surveyed in
1979.'17 Follow up interviews were conducted annually through 1994 and biennially
since then. 175 Questions regarding healthcare coverage and bankruptcy filings were
added to the survey in 2004, scaled back in 2006, and then re-introduced in 2008,
since when they have remained relatively constant. 176
See Scott Fay, Erik Hurst & Michelle J. White, The Household BankruptcyDecision, 92 AM. ECON. REV.
706, 706 (2002) ("Until very recently, studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult, because
no household-level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings."); see also Ian Domowitz
& Robert L. Sartain, Determinantsof the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403, 403 (1999) (noting
"[r]esearch in the area of consumer bankruptcy is largely based on the analysis of aggregate filing data").
172 See Aanaging Aedical Bills, supra note 139, at 239-43 (noting the court record method of collecting
data "is incapable of capturing some of the most significant medical obligations incurred before bankruptcy").
171

173 See generally NationalLongitudinal Surveys, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., https://www.bls.gov/nls/

y79summary.htm (last modified June 25, 2003).
174 See NationalLongitudinalSurveys, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., https://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm
(last modified June 25, 2003).
175 See id.
176 See NationalLongitudinal Survey of Youth, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT.,
https://www.nlsinfo.org/co
ntent/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/questionnaires (follow URL; select "2004" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding healthcare); see also id. (follow URL; select "2004" drop down;
select "health"; navigate to questions regarding bankruptcy); id. (follow URL; select "2006" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding healthcare); id. (follow URL; select "2006" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding bankruptcy); id. (follow URL; select "2008" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding healthcare); id. (follow URL; select "2008" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding bankruptcy); id. (follow URL; select "2010" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding healthcare); id. (follow URL; select "2010" drop down; select
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Our analysis focused on responses derived from the four waves of surveys in the
years 2008-2014, for two primary reasons. First, major changes to bankruptcy law
occurred in 2005 through BAPCPA, 7 7 which may have caused filing rates to spike
in 2004. This made it more difficult to directly compare results in 2004 to those in
the following wave. Second, there was greater consistency in the wording of
questions related to healthcare coverage, debts, and bankruptcy in the 2008-2014
data. 78 At the time of our analysis, survey data from the 2016 iteration of the
NLSY79 was not yet available.
The data from the NLSY79 survey are unique in that they provide information
on bankruptcy and health insurance coverage for a nationally representative sample
of middle age adults, the age group most likely to file for bankruptcy.1 79 Importantly,
the NLSY79 survey directly asks respondents about whether they are covered by
health insurance and from where this coverage originates.
Because the NLSY79 is
a longitudinal survey, we can characterize respondents as either having consistent
health care coverage, interrupted coverage, or no coverage at all by examining
whether their coverage changed since the previous wave. We can also differentiate
between coverage types (e.g., public or employer-based). Since the survey also asks
respondents whether they have filed for bankruptcy since the last wave of data
collection,' 8 ' we can differentiate between those who have ever filed for bankruptcy
and those who filed within each two-year period. Past research has typically relied
on proxies for health insurance coverage and has not been able to temporally situate
changes in coverage with bankruptcy filings. To our knowledge, the NLSY79 is the
only data set available for examining bankruptcy and health care coverage at the
individual level before, during, and after the implementation of BAPCPA and the
's

ACA.

"health"; navigate to questions regarding bankruptcy); id. (follow URL; select "2012" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding healthcare); id. (follow URL; select "2012" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding bankruptcy); id. (follow URL; select "2014" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding healthcare); id. (follow URL; select "2014" drop down; select
"health"; navigate to questions regarding bankruptcy).
177 See Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31
(2007) ("The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 dramatically
changed several aspects of individual consumer bankruptcy law."); see also Spurr & Ball, supra note 56, at 28
(noting "BAPCPA is the most significant revision of the Bankruptcy Code since its enactment in 1978").
17s Regardless, we did perform a series of analyses with the 2004 data, which is available upon request.
Findings were substantively similar to the findings reported here for the 2008, 2010, and 2012 waves of data.
179 See Leslie E. Linfield, The Composite Consumer Debtor, 31 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2011, at 26-27
(finding adults aged 45 years and older have increased their rate of filing for bankruptcy by 19% and adults
aged 55-64 and 65 and older have combined increased their rate of filing for bankruptcy by 25%).
180 See generally NationalLongitudinalSurvey of Youth, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., https://www.nlsi
nfo.org/investigator/pages/search jsp?s=NLSY79# (last modified Aug. 24, 2017) (directing participants to
answer questions, such as whether an adult lives with their partner, whether he or she is covered by a
hospitalization plan, and whether their children have health insurance coverage).
181 See generally id. (emphasizing the longitudinal nature of the study and listing the array of categories
from which participants are questioned with regards to their finances, such as employment, income, and
assets).
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A. Measures
We rely on self-reports of new filings for personal bankruptcy (i.e., debtors
choosing to file under either chapter 7 or 13 of the Code) since the last interview for
our outcome variable of interest. Respondents are asked at each wave whether they
have ever declared bankruptcy, and if so, the month and date of the filing. If the most
recent bankruptcy occurred in the time since their last interview date, respondents
were coded as having filed. In total, 454 bankruptcies were reported throughout the
study period, with 70 in 2008, 103 in 2010, 121 in 2012, and 91 in 2014.
Our primary measure of health insurance coverage comes from respondent
reports of whether they were covered by any kind of private or governmental health
insurance (including hospitalization plans), and whether they report any time since
their last interview in which they were not covered by health insurance. Participants
who reported having some form of insurance at both the current interview and their
last interview, and who reported that there was no time where they were not covered
in between, were coded as having full coverage for the two-year period and serve as
the reference group in all of our models. Those who reported having insurance at one
point in time but not the other (e.g., at their last interview, but not the current one),
or who reported having no coverage at some time in the interim were classified as
having had interrupted coverage. We initially coded differently those who lost,
gained, or simply failed to maintain coverage between interviews, but found little
variation in bankruptcy filing rates and other study variables between these groups,
which prompted us to adopt the broader classification of respondents having
interrupted coverage. Respondents who reported having no coverage at either the
time of the current interview or at the previous interview were coded as having no
coverage.
We further differentiated health insurance coverage by type of primary plan to
determine whether people covered by certain types of insurance were more or less
likely to file for bankruptcy. The NLSY79 survey options include: (1) having
insurance provided by their own or a spouse's employer; (2) benefitting from a
workers' union plan; (3) purchasing a plan directly from a provider; (4) receiving
Medicaid or Medicare; (5) receiving coverage through Medi-GAP (i.e., private
insurance to supplement Medicare insurance); (6) experiencing coverage through the
military; (7) receiving some other government plan; (8) having only a single service
plan; or (9) using a medical savings account. 182 The NLSY79 also measures risk and
protective factors related to bankruptcy including respondents' household income (in
$1,000 increments and top-coded at $500,000), personal debt (i.e., a sum of all
reported credit card debt, personal debts, and debts owed to private businesses or
medical service providers, in $1,000 increments and top-coded at $500,000, but not
including the amount owed on mortgages), employment (i.e., the percentage of weeks
182 See generally id. (providing a mechanism by which someone can search the NLSY79 study by entering
relevant variables and filtering the results according to the particular health-related category).
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that the respondent reported working over the past year), and whether a health issue
limited the respondent's ability to engage in routine activities (i.e., yes or no, since
last interview). 83
B. Analysis and Findings
We used a series of cross-sectional logistic regression models to examine the
association between health care coverage, debt, sociodemographic and other risk
factors, and new bankruptcy filings since the last biennial survey. 8 4 First, we fit
baseline models that predict the odds of filing for bankruptcy between respondents
with no coverage and interrupted coverage, compared to those with full coverage
(Model 1). Next, we tested whether these differences in filing rates by coverage
remain after controlling for basic demographic and economic characteristics
including marital status, age, gender, race/ethnicity, parenthood, employment, debt,
and income (Model 2). Finally, we examined how the association between health
insurance coverage and bankruptcy changes with the addition of a binary indicator
that signifies whether the person experienced a health limitation since the last
interview (Model 3).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by year for the NLSY79 variables that we
included in our models. We can see that about 0.9% of the NLSY79 sample filed for
bankruptcy in 2008. This frequency increases by about 50% in 2010 (to 1.4%) and
85% in 2012 (to 1.8%) and then decreases in 2014 (to 1.3%) to approximately the
2010 level. These rates are substantially higher than the national rates, likely due to
both the NLSY79's oversampling of lower-income individuals and its focus on an age
group that is more likely to file for bankruptcy relief (i.e., middle-age individuals),
but follow a somewhat similar pattern with higher rates immediately following the
economic recession of 2008-2009. During this time period, national bankruptcy
filing rates ranged from a high of 0.65% in 2010 to a low of 0.37% in 2014.86
Turning to rates of health insurance coverage, we see some, but much less,
variation across the waves of the NLSY79 data set. The percentage of the population
183 See generally id.
1s This strategy allowed us to more clearly determine how the timing of coverage and other factors relate
to the odds of filing, while avoiding the need for complex three-way interactions between multiple timevarying factors to examine these associations in a repeated measures analysis. As a sensitivity check, we also
ran similar analyses that more fully exploited the panel nature of the NLSY79 using growth curve models
predicting bankruptcy during the period 2008 to 2014, which confirmed that the general findings presented
here were relatively constant over time and robust to alternate model specification (results available upon
request). Further robustness checks involved running all analyses with variables denoting change in respondent
characteristics since the last wave (e.g., change in marital status, change in weeks worked, change in health
limitations), but these variables were roundly insignificant and indicated that the statuses themselves were
more important predictors of bankruptcy than change in these characteristics over time (results available upon
request).
185 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 38-39 ("In 1997, nearly one in ten of the debtors who filed for
bankruptcy was fifty-five or older.").
186 See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CT., United States Bankruptcy Court - Judicial Business 2014
(2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-bankruptcy-courts-judicial-business-2014.
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with full coverage rose from 72.5% in 2008 to a high of 76.2% in 2014. This increase
was not monotonic: after increasing to 73.5% in 2010 there was a slight dip in 2012
to 72.4%. The biggest increase was between 2012 and 2014. This increase was most
likely the result of the ACA, which mandated that all citizens and legal residents in
the United States possess some form of health insurance or pay a financial penalty.8 7
While the proportion of the sample that had full health coverage slowly increased
between 2008-2010, this time-period also saw a small increase in the percentage of
the population that had no coverage (11.2% to 12.5%) and a decrease of those who
had interrupted coverage (16.3% to 14%). Not surprisingly, given the changes in full
coverage in 2014, we also observed the lowest level of no coverage (8.4%) in the last
wave of the data. While national data make it hard to estimate the percentage of the
population that had full, as opposed to interrupted coverage, estimates from the
National Health Interview Survey suggest that the percentage of the NLSY79 sample
with no insurance is somewhat lower than a national sample of the same age whose
rates of coverage rose from 13.6% in 2008, up to 16. 1% in 2012, and then down to
14% in 2014.""
We conducted a series of models which demonstrate the relationship between
health insurance coverage and the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy before and after
controlling for a variety of demographic, economic, and health-related
characteristics. Table 2 demonstrates that without controlling for other factors,
respondents with no coverage were no more likely to file for bankruptcy, but those
with interrupted coverage were more than twice as likely to file for bankruptcy as
their counterparts with full coverage (p<.01), a statistically significant finding.1 89
There is a slight attenuation of the influence of having interrupted coverage on the
likelihood of bankruptcy in model 2 after controlling for the sociodemographic
variables of age, marital status, gender, race, whether the respondent had dependent
children, along with measures of employment, debt and income; nevertheless the
relationship is still statistically significant (p<.05). The same is true in model 3, after
controlling for health limitations. In the final model, the only variables other than
interrupted health coverage that are associated with bankruptcy using conventional
levels of statistical significance are income-those with higher household incomes
are less likely to file for bankruptcy (p<.001), and number of weeks worked-those
who worked more weeks were more likely to file for bankruptcy (p<.01). Never
having been married is associated with a lower likelihood of filing for bankruptcy

187

See Hackney et al., supra note 6, at 1958.

1ss See generally CTRS. FOR

DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE (2017),

https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/health-insurance.htm.
189 See Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at W5-66. In their 2005 study,
Himmelstein and colleagues also found that a "lapse in health insurance coverage during the two years before
filing was a strong predictor of a medical cause of bankruptcy." Id. This pattern was also uncovered in their
2007 study. See Aedical Bankruptcy in the United States, supra note 134, at 744.
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and having a health limitation is associated with a higher likelihood of filing for
bankruptcy, if we relax the levels of statistical significance to p<. 10.
In Table 3, representing the respondents in 2010, the findings are virtually
identical to those obtained from the 2008 data. While slightly attenuated between
models 1 and 2, the increased likelihood of filing for bankruptcy associated with
having interrupted coverage is statistically significant across all of the models, and
even after controlling for all of the other variables, those with interrupted coverage
are more than twice as likely to file for bankruptcy (p<.0 1). Likewise, working more
weeks in the previous year and having a lower household income are again both
associated with a higher likelihood of filing bankruptcy (p<.01 and p<.001,
respectively). At the marginally significant level (p<. 10), never being married is
again associated with a lower likelihood of filing for bankruptcy, and at this level of
statistical significance we also witness a lower likelihood of filing among black
respondents.
Our findings from the analysis of the 2012 data, presented in Table 4, follow a
very similar, but not identical, pattern. Across the three models, respondents with
interrupted health care coverage were 105%, 88%, and 8 3 % more likely to file for
bankruptcy relief as compared to those possessing full coverage. Those with no
coverage did not exhibit significant differences from those with full coverage. Again,
the number of weeks worked was positively, and income negatively, associated with
filing for bankruptcy (p<.001). The 2012 models indicate two other statistically
significant relationships. Respondents who were never married were less likely, and
those with health limitations were more likely to file for bankruptcy (p<.001 and
p<.05, respectively).
In 2014 we see a major shift in the data. Controlling for type of health insurance
coverage causes intermittent coverage to remain statistically significant (p<.01) in
predicting a bankruptcy filing. However, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that
the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy for those with interrupted coverage or no
coverage at all is not significantly different than the likelihood for those with full
coverage when controlling for all demographic variables. It should be noted that this
is not just the result of a small shift that changes the level of significance. Between
2008 and 2012, after controlling for all of the other characteristics, those with
interrupted coverage were between 83% and 112% more likely to file for bankruptcy
protection. In 2014, they are only 10% more likely to do so. The other significant
predictors from the 2012 models are also not statistically significant in 2014. In fact,
the only significant factors in the 2014 models are household income and number of
weeks worked (p<.01), the effects of which are similar to what we demonstrate in
previous years. The data from 2014 appear to be an anomaly from the pattern
demonstrated in previous years, and when available, the data from 2016 may shed
light on whether the experience of intermittent health insurance coverage remains a
statistically significant predictor of a future bankruptcy filing.1 90

190

The data was analyzed and statistical tests were run before the release of the 2016 wave of the NLSY79.
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Looking across three of the four waves of data, we see a general pattern that
indicates a strong relationship between interrupted health insurance coverage and
filing for bankruptcy. This led us to question what made having an interruption in
health care coverage so problematic, and also what influences the likelihood of being
in this situation. Quantitative data alone does not allow us to answer the first
question, however, the data did allow us to further investigate the latter. To do so we
ran additional analyses with the 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves to identify factors
associated with interrupted coverage. Table 6 provides a summary of these results.191
The strongest patterns, those that are evident across all waves of the data, suggest
that the presence of health limitations, lower household incomes, divorce, and being
Latino/a are all associated with having interrupted health insurance coverage. 192In
three of the waves we also see that never being married, being separated from a
spouse, and working less is associated with a higher likelihood of interrupted
coverage. We further tested whether changes in these characteristics (e.g., such as
moving from married to divorced since the last wave) additionally influenced the
likelihood of experiencing interrupted coverage, but these changes were roundly nonsignificant.1 93 Due to the nature of the data, it is difficult to demonstrate that any of
the factors described above cause interrupted coverage. However, given that many
insurance plans are connected to an individual's or their spouse's employment, and
the degree to which a health limitation can create employment instability, it makes
sense that these factors appear to play an important role.
Taken together, the two sets of analyses suggest that marital, employment, and
health statuses are significantly related to interrupted coverage, which in turn plays
an important role in shaping the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy. We conducted
one final round of analyses to determine whether the type of health insurance that a
respondent had in the previous wave was associated with an increased likelihood of
experiencing intermittent coverage, above and beyond measured socioeconomic and
health-related characteristics. Table 7 demonstrates that the type of insurance
coverage is, in fact, a significant predictor of intermittent coverage, which itself
increases the odds of filing for bankruptcy relief.
Compared to those with employer-provided health insurance, individuals
possessing privately-purchased health insurance face significantly greater odds of
experiencing intermittent coverage across all years. This finding makes intuitive
sense: individuals who pay for health insurance out of pocket, rather than having the
cost deducted automatically from wages, are probably more likely to stop paying for
health insurance when finances get tight.
Full tables for each wave are available upon request.
See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 MO. L. REV. 919, 926 (2006)
(arguing, among other things, various provisions of the Code indirectly favor Caucasian debtors over AfricanAmericans, Hispanics and Asians). Bankruptcy scholars have focused on the differential effects of the Code
and bankruptcy law practice upon non-white ethnicities. See generally Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors:
Bankruptcy Disparitiesby Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231 (2009) (discussing the results of an empirical study
demonstrating outcomes in bankruptcy for minorities are less favorable than outcomes for whites).
193 Results available upon request.
191

192

2019]

MO VING BEYOND MEDICAL DEBT

125

Individuals possessing public health insurance (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare) also
have increased odds of experiencing intermittent coverage across all years, though
the evidence is only marginally significant in 2012. This finding was surprising
insofar as we initially assumed that possessing publicly-assisted health insurance
would shield lower-income individuals from intermittency and, in turn, severe
indebtedness. But after speaking with individuals who are engaged in healthcare
policy, we learned that oftentimes lower-income individuals "chum" on and off
government-provided health insurance for several different reasons, including
income volatility due to periods of full employment and unemployment.1 94 If indeed
a "churning" effect results in intermittent coverage among those on publicly-provided
health insurance, which in turn leads to a greater predictive effect for filing
bankruptcy, then at least based upon our data from 2008 to 2014, it appears that those
who most need protection from overwhelming medical costs (i.e., lower-income
Americans) are not receiving adequate health insurance protection even after the
advent of the ACA.
As described above, our primary finding is that health insurance coverage has an
impact on an individual's odds of filing for bankruptcy. After controlling for other
potentially relevant factors, experiencing an interruption in health insurance coverage
in the immediate two-year time frame significantly increases the likelihood of filing
for bankruptcy. Our secondary finding is that the type of health insurance coverage
one possesses leads to greater odds of intermittency, thus putting individuals at a
higher risk of experiencing a bankruptcy filing. Perhaps contrary to common
expectations, our study did not find that simply being without health insurance
coverage leads to filing for bankruptcy. Our data does not provide any indication of
why this would be the case, although other research has suggested that some
individuals may be too poor to file for bankruptcy.1 9 5 This research suggests that
individuals in the lowest income brackets may lack both the resources and the
incentives to file for a discharge of debt because they cannot afford the bankruptcy
court filing fees and associated attorneys' fees, and have few assets to protect from
the reach of creditors.1 96 This does not mean that such individuals would not benefit
194Pamela

Farley Short et al., Churn, Churn, Churn: How Instability ofHealth Insurance ShapesAmerica's

UninsuredProblem, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND: TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH INSURANCE 5-

6 (Nov. 2003), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fc3 1/4dacbc4Oa76d79759083e49c56b64b0d1
7a0.pdf
("For low-income families, turnover in Medicaid contributed to instability in health insurance. Over half of
people with low income who were repeatedly uninsured left and reentered Medicaid or SCHIP during the four
years. This highlights the instability that occurs when factors such as changes in work hours or earnings,
becoming pregnant, or moving into a different age group (e.g., turning 19 and thus becoming an adult) can
eliminate eligibility for public coverage.").
195 See Richard M. Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (2008) (stating greater concentrations of poor debtors go into informal bankruptcy by simply
refusing to pay debts).
19 6
See Stefania Albanesi & Jaromir Nosal, Insolvency After the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform 1, 3 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24934, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24934 ("Since the fees for
both chapters increased by similar magnitudes post-reform, this suggests that the up-front nature of the filing
cost for Chapter 7 bankruptcy plays a crucial role in discouraging potential filers, supporting the interpretation
that these individuals are liquidity constrained."). The bankruptcy court does have the ability to waive the
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from health insurance coverage, but only that the lack of such coverage does not
increase the likelihood of a bankruptcy filing. Unfortunately, given the constraints
of our data, we can do no more than speculate as to whether this possibility explains
our findings.
However, the strong relationship between an interruption in health insurance
coverage and filing for bankruptcy in the NLSY79 data does suggest that losing
health insurance or experiencing an interruption in coverage gives rise to serious
financial vulnerability, which can necessitate a bankruptcy filing. When health
insurance is interrupted, medical bills may arise that impose a financial shock on
families, particularly if the interruption in coverage or the resulting uncovered
medical bills were not expected. 197
Prior to the passage of the ACA, an interruption in health insurance coverage
could have also led to issues with future medical bills, as insurance companies
frequently refused to cover pre-existing conditions for individuals who were not
covered by health insurance during the onset of the condition.198 As a separate
concern, individuals tend to avoid seeking medical care during periods in which they
are not covered by insurance, often creating medical issues that are more difficultand expensive-to deal with down the road. 199 Particularly for populations already
at risk for filing bankruptcy, typically the middle-class and below, 200 the additional
financial burden of uncovered medical expenses may be the financial shock that
necessitates a bankruptcy filing.
That said, demonstrating causation between an interruption of health insurance
and a future bankruptcy filing is difficult. It may be the case that an interruption in
health insurance coverage simply reflects other life events that are themselves
strongly correlated with filing for bankruptcy, such as unemployment, acute health
problems, or divorce.20 1 Interruptions in health insurance coverage are strongly
correlated with such common life events, as the bankruptcy law literature has
convincingly demonstrated.202 Indeed, the correlation between an interruption in
health insurance coverage and the presence of a health limitation may indicate that
requisite court filing fees in a chapter 7 case "if the court determines that such individual has income less than
150 percent of the income official poverty line . . applicable to a family of the size involved and is unable to
pay that fee in installments." 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1) (2012).
197 See Lucie Kalousova & Sarah A. Burgard, Debt and Foregone Medical Care, 54 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 204, 207 (2013) (detailing how medical debt is a special type of debt and is typically correlated with
foregoing necessary medical care).
198 See James C. Capretta & Tom Miller, How to Cover Pre-existing Conditions, 4 NAT'L AFF. 110, 112
(2010), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313445191 (noting insurance companies deny coverage for
certain pre-existing conditions for a set period of time after a customer enrolls).
199 See Kalousova & Burgard, supra note 197, at 207 (noting medical debt is "correlated with foregoing
physician visits, putting off medical care, and not filing prescription medications").
200 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 27 ("The people who file for bankruptcy are a cross-section of
society, and bankruptcy is a middle-class phenomenon.").
201 See Maroto, supra note 2, at 187 ("Research supports a direct connection between employment, family,
and health circumstances and bankruptcy.").
202See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 170 (recognizing circumstances, such as illness or an accident, for
which "income drops suddenly, and insurance coverage may be lost").
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individuals become too sick to work. As a consequence, these individuals lose both
theirjob and their health insurance, thereby severely undercutting their ability to treat
the illness that resulted in the job loss to begin with. When this happens, medical
bills can quickly mount, thereby placing tremendous pressure on individuals and
families to meet their regular and expected financial obligations. When indebtedness
becomes insurmountable, resorting to the bankruptcy process is a common
response. 20 3 While we have included many of these factors as control variables in our
models, it is impossible to know whether we have completely captured such dynamic
processes. Despite the inherent difficulty in teasing out the causes of a particular
bankruptcy filing, the NLSY79 data nevertheless demonstrates that interruptions in
health insurance coverage are significant factors in predicting a future bankruptcy
filing and, in turn, that type of health care coverage is predictive of an interruption in
coverage. Specifically, individuals who experience an interruption in coverage for
the time period between 2008 and 2012 were 60% to 110% more likely to file for
bankruptcy protection than those who possessed full coverage. The diminished
relationship between interruptions in health care coverage and bankruptcy filings in
our 2014 results call for additional data collection.
V. DISCUSSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH
This study makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the association
between health insurance coverage and bankruptcy filings, both expanding and
improving on earlier efforts to test the associations between medical and financial
difficulties.
Our findings demonstrate that interruptions in health insurance
coverage-whether they reflect a part of a larger constellation of life events that
correlate to a bankruptcy filing or by themselves prompt an increase in financial
As
distress-are predictive of a bankruptcy filing on an individual level.
Himmelstein and colleagues asserted, "[e]ven brief lapses in insurance coverage may
be ruinous and should not be viewed as benign." 2 04 Moreover, our data also suggest
that the type of health insurance coverage one possesses may play a role in
experiencing an interruption in coverage and, in turn, a future bankruptcy
filing. These results strongly suggest that additional research is necessary to better
identify and explain why interruption in health insurance and, indirectly, type of
coverage, has such a strong predictive effect on a future bankruptcy filing. If lapse
(and preventing its occurrence) and adequacy of health insurance coverage are indeed
keys to preventing financial ruin on the individual level, then federal and state
legislatures and healthcare policymakers should reevaluate national social policy
regarding the provision of medical care. Bankruptcy can-and does-provide relief
203 See Sarah O'Brien, For some consumers, bankruptcy is the solution to crushing debt, CNBC (last
updated Apr. 11, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/05/bankruptcy-is-the-solution-to-crushingdebt-for-some-consumers.html (noting the probability of bankruptcy filings in the upcoming fiscal year as the
weipht of crushing debt is insufferable).
20 Illness andInjury as Contributorsto Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at W5-71.
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from prior debts and thereby serves as a type of insurer of last resort for medical
debts. 2 05 But perhaps social policy should be geared towards a more preventative
function, such that bankruptcy as a consequence of medical debts is largely
unnecessary. The social utility of providing consumers with a fresh financial start
through discharge is of limited value because the bankruptcy process can only erase
pre-petition debt. 2 0 6 As Melissa Jacoby has argued,
[t]o the extent that [a] debtor will continue to need expensive medical
care uncovered by insurance, the bills may quickly mount again,
particularly if work capacity is reduced. The Bankruptcy Code does
not permit [a] debtor to receive discharges in rapid succession, so she
cannot readily relieve subsequent medical-related debts.207
In light of this, while we recognize the value of revising the Code to provide more
effective relief to those with medical debt (and indeed, many of the proposed
amendments should be expanded to all debtors), when it comes to preventing
financial ruin caused by medical costs the focus should instead be on the scope and
adequacy of health insurance in the United States, both private and public. Moreover,
if Congress remains serious about reducing bankruptcy filing rates in the United
States generally, then the answer might not be punishing individuals and families in
financial distress by making the process more expensive and less hospitable, but
rather by expanding and improving Medicaid and Medicare, and incentivizing
employers to provide much more robust health insurance plans to their employees.
According to statistics compiled by the United States Courts, approximately $52
billion of unsecured debt was discharged nationally during calendar year 2017.208 For
the sake of argument, even if 25% of the discharged debt was medically-related and
caused the bankruptcy filing, then perhaps $13 billion (one quarter of the overall
amount) could be spent improving health insurance policies or taking steps to reduce
medical costs for all.
We do not advocate for any particular solution to the issue of medical expenses
in the United States. Clearly, there are a myriad of policy and normative issues, the
discussion of which would be well beyond the scope of this Article. For example, as
Stephen J. Ware has aptly argued, deciding to move to universal, governmentsponsored health care for low-income families and the poor raises the normative
205 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Costs of Sickness: Exploring the Intersections, 71
Mo. L. REV. 903, 918 (2006) ("They also now know that bankruptcy is serving more of an ad hoc insurance
function regarding medical-related financial distress than they may have realized.").
206 See In re Manning, 505 B.R. 383, 386 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2014) (stating "a discharge in bankruptcy generally
relieves a debtor from all prepetition debt. . . ").
207 The Debtor-Patient,supra note 7, at 462-63 (noting concerns associated with chronic health problems
for bankruptcy filers).
208 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CT., BAPCPA Table 1A (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/ba
pcpa-la/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-act-bapcpa/2017/12/31
(showing assets and
liabilities reported by individual debtors in chapter 7 cases with primarily consumer debts commenced during
the 12-month period ending December 31, 2017, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2012)).

2019]

MO VING BEYOND MEDICAL DEBT

129

questions of "who is poor enough to receive a subsidy and how much of a subsidy
will be provided." 2 09 Similarly, there are real questions regarding how much health
insurance the country can and should provide under such a universal plan without
imposing crippling taxation on the population as a whole.2 10 Privately purchased
insurance is likely to vary widely, as it does currently, on what is covered and the
extent to which individuals must share in the costs of health services.21 The data in
this study give no indication as to how much medical insurance coverage is enough
to prevent financial ruin, and it is imminently possible that the amount is highly
situation specific. Rather than attempt to solve the puzzle here, we present our
findings with the hope that future studies can continue to shed light on the
macrosocial connection between health insurance and consumer bankruptcy in the
United States.
Avenues for future research abound. For example, future researchers can revisit
the NLSY79 in subsequent years (e.g., 2016 and 2018 when data become available)
to see if the patterns regarding lapse and a future bankruptcy remain statistically
significant. Future researchers might also assemble aggregate data from various
sources (e.g., United States Courts' records, state and federal health interview
surveys) to determine whether the relationship between health insurance lapse and
consumer bankruptcy remains statistically significant. In addition, future researchers
could develop a nationally representative data set through surveys that specifically
includes both bankruptcy filers and non-filers so as to see if patterns between health
insurance coverage and personal bankruptcy persist. Finally, future researchers
should undertake qualitative research studies in order to obtain rich, in-depth
information on how individuals and families with varying socio-demographic
characteristics deal with medical debt in light of health insurance coverage, why
people lapse or "chum" with respect to their health insurance coverage, and whether
uncovered medical expenses are indeed a processual pathway leading to financial
indebtedness.
CONCLUSION

Approximately thirty years ago, Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay
Lawrence Westbrook noted that "[m]edical debt has had a particularly ambiguous
and erratic impact on the making of consumer bankruptcy policy. ,212 This sentiment
209 Stephen J. Ware, "Medical-RelatedFinancialDistress" and Health Care Finance:A Reply to Professor
MelissaJacoby, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2007) (describing controversial topics implicate the decision
of a partisan government to redistribute wealth).
210See id. at 1261 (discussing whether "financial distress" can be defined to determine who is eligible for
subsidized health care).
211 See Managing Medical Bills, supra note 139, at 244 ("For many reasons, today's health care finance
system expressly imposes cost-sharing and direct patient liability on patients who are covered by health
insurance."); see also Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, GlobalLessonsfrom ConsumerBankruptcy
and HealthcareReforms in the United States: A Struggling Social Safety Net, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 343,
359 (2007) (illustrating who typically pays each portion for employer provided health insurance).
212 As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 46, at 166.
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still rings true today. Nonetheless, through the findings of this empirical study, we
argue that the more appropriate line of inquiry is the connection between possessing
continuous health insurance coverage (or not) and the need to file for consumer
bankruptcy. Accordingly, we urge lawmakers and policymakers to explore this
connection in greater depth moving forward.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979

Health Coverage
Full
None
Intermittent
Coverage Type
None or Single
Service
Employer
Provided
Private Purchase
Government
Assistance
Bankruptcy Filing
Demographic
Characteristics
Female
Never Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Age
Hispanic
Black
Has Child
Employment/
Income
% of Weeks
Worked
Household
Income ($lk)
Personal Debt
($1k)
Health Limitations
Number of
Observations

2008
Mean

2010
Mean

2012
Mean

2014
Mean

(Standard
Deviation)

(Standard

(Standard
Deviation)

(Standard
Deviation)

Deviation)

0.725
0.112
0.163

(0.447)
(0.315)
(0.369)

0.735
0.125
0.140

(0.441)
(0.331)
(0.347)

0.724
0.126
0.150

(0.447)
(0.332)
(0.357)

0.762
0.084
0.154

(0.426)
(0.277)
(0.361)

0.168

(0.374)

0.191

(0.393)

0.189

(0.391)

0.116

(0.320)

0.693

(0.461)

0.656

(0.475)

0.634

(0.482)

0.627

(0.484)

0.038
0.101

(0.190)
(0.302)

0.035
0.118

(0.185)
(0.322)

0.038
0.139

(0.191)
(0.346)

0.019
0.238

(0.136)
(0.426)

0.009

(0.095)

0.014

(0.117)

0.018

(0.132)

0.013

(0.114)

0.521
0.170
0.055
0.195
0.018
46.626
0.189
0.308
0.854

(0.500)
(0.376)
(0.227)
(0.396)
(0.131)
(2.234)
(0.392)
(0.462)
(0.353)

0.521
0.166
0.053
0.206
0.020
48.547
0.188
0.309
0.861

(0.500)
(0.373)
(0.223)
(0.405)
(0.140)
(2.234)
(0.391)
(0.462)
(0.346)

0.524
0.162
0.052
0.221
0.023
51.299
0.191
0.310
0.865

(0.499)
(0.368)
(0.222)
(0.415)
(0.150)
(2.236)
(0.393)
(0.462)
(0.341)

0.526
0.158
0.050
0.224
0.029
53.444
0.187
0.313
0.864

(0.499)
(0.365)
(0.217)
(0.417)
(0.167)
(2.218)
(0.390)
(0.464)
(0.343)

0.779

(0.383)

0.737

(0.406)

0.733

(0.420)

0.716

(0.428)

61.918

(66.50
3)
(21.11
9
(0.373)

60.443

(67.88
5)
(71.73

61.760
10)
6.127

(72.22

63.739
10.455

(0.387)

0.226
6584

(25.80
4)
(0.419)

(79.67
0)
(34.53
7)
(0.430)

5.956
0.167
7016

28.460

_L4)
0.183
6896

fn

I

0.245
6280
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Health Coverage (vs. Full)
None
Intermittent
Demographic Characteristics
Female
Never Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Age
Hispanic
Black
Has Child

Model

Model

Model

1
Odds

Standard

2
Odds

Standard

3
Odds

Standard

Ratio

Error

Ratio

Error

Ratio

Error

0.828
2.303

(0.395)
(0.638)

0,631
1.951

(0.316)
(0.579)

0.651
1.942

(0.325)
(0.576)

0.693
0.390
0.520
0.659
1.761
1.045
0.645
0.724
1.344

(0.196)
(0.324)
(0.221)
(1.108)
(0.059)
(0.179)
(0.235)
(0.222)
(0.630)

0.691
0.379
0.512
0.658
1.767
1.039
0.659
0.735
1.329

(0.179)
(0.191)
(0.319)
(0.221)
(1.113)
(0.059)
(0.240)
(0.225)
(0.621)

2.532
0.986
1.005

(1.018)
(0.004)
(0.003)

0.001
0.052
7016

(0.004)

3.522
0.987
1.005
1.830
0.001
0.056
7016

(1.584)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.649)
(0.003)

*

*

*

Table 2: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Bankruptcy by Respondent
Characteristics, 2008

0.008

0.012
7016

(0.001)

*

*

*

%of Weeks Worked
Household Income ($Ik)
Personal Debt (S1k)
Health Limitations
Intercept
R Squared
Number of Observations
* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

*

Employment/Income
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Bankruptcy by Respondent
Characteristics, 2010

Health Coverage (vs.
Full)
None
1.397
Intermittent
2.615
Demographic
Characteristics
Female
Never Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Age
Hispanic
Black
Has Child
Employment/Income
%of Weeks Worked
Household Income
($1k)
Personal Debt (S1k)
Health Limitations
Intercept
0.011
R Squared
0.015
Number of
6896
Observations
* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Standard
Error

(0.434)
(0.621)

*

Model
2
Odds
Ratio

Standard
Error

1.077
2.115

(0.356)
(0.537)

0.972

(0.205)
(0.189)
(0.325)
(0.193)
(0.548)
(0.047)
(0.210)
(0.169)
(0.617)

0.476
0.720
0.723
0.889
1.002
0.749
0.648
1.537

2.079

(0.001)

0.986

(0.605)
(0.003)

1.001

(0.002)

0.012
0.045
6896

(0.027)

**

*
*

Model
3
Odds
Ratio

Standard
Error

1.096
2.118

(0.362)
(0.537)

0.971
0.473
0.711
0.722
0.877
0.999
0.757
0.650
1.531

(0.205)
(0.188)
(0.321)
(0.193)
(0.541)
(0.047)
(0.212)
(0.170)
(0.614)

2.313
0.986

(0.744)
(0.003)

1.001
1.259

(0.002)
(0.366)
(0.028)

0.012
1 0.046
6896

**

*

Model
1
Odds
Ratio

*

NLSY 2010
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**

Standard
Error

0.728
1.878

(0.250)
(0.434)

0.744
1.830

(0.255)
(0.424)

1.321
0.267
0.374
0.816
1.154
0.958
1.167
1.358

1.313
0.263
0.372
0.814
1.144
0.954
1.188
1.368

1.117

(0.259)
(0.110)
(0.199)
(0.188)
(0.563)
(0.041)
(0.296)
(0.301)
(0.393)

1.105

(0.258)
(0.108)
(0.197)
(0.188)
(0.559)
(0.041)
(0.302)
(0.304)
(0.388)

3.468
0.990

(1.023)
(0.003)

*
*

4.627
0.991

(1.493)
(0.003)

1.004

(0.002)

*

1.004

(0.002)
(0.440)
(0.149)

*

1761
(0.001)

0.078
0.056
6584

(0.177)

0.066
0.060
6584

*

(0.276)
(0.445)

Standard
Error

Model
3
Odds
Ratio

*

Health Coverage (vs.
Full)
None
0.849
2.050
Intermittent
Demographic
Characteristics
Female
Never Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Age
Hispanic
Black
Has Child
Employment/Income
% of Weeks Worked
Household Income
($1k)
Personal Debt (S 1k)
Health Limitations
Intercept
0.008
R Squared
0.010
Number of
6584
Observations
* p<0.05, ** p<.0l, *** p<.001

Standard
Error

Model
2
Odds
Ratio

*

Model
1
Odds
Ratio

*

NLSY 2012

*

Table 4: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Bankruptcy by Respondent
Characteristics, 2012
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Table 5: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Bankruptcy by Respondent
Characteristics, 2014

Health Coverage (vs.
Full)
None
Intermittent
Demographic
Characteristics
Female
Never Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Age
Hispanic
Black
Has Child
Employment/Income
% of Weeks Worked
Household Income

Model

Model

1

2

Model
3

Odds

Standard

Odds

Standard

Odds

Standard

Ratio

Error

Ratio

Error

Ratio

Error

0.595
1.464

(0.308)
(0.396)

0.440
1.105

(0.233)
(0.313)

0.457
1.104

(0.242)
(0.313)

0.945

(0.214)
(0.328)
(0.365)
(0.370)
(0.677)
(0.051)
(0.298)
(0.306)
(0.908)

0.952
0.781
0.574
1.364
1.061
1.004
0.974
1.177
1.971

(0.215)
(0.320)
(0.356)
(0.366)
(0.659)
(0.050)
(0.305)
(0.308)
(0.897)

2.836
0.992

(1.027)
(0.003)

0.995

(0.007)
(0.482)
(0.010)

**

0.801
0.589
1.382
1.092
1.007
0.953
1.172
1.992

2.163
0.992

(0.666)
(0.003)

0.995

(0.007)

*

*

(S1k)
Personal Debt ($1k)
Health Limitations
0.008
Intercept
R Squared
0.004
6280
Number of Observations
* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

(0.002)

0.004
0.033
6280

(0.012)

1.561
0.004
0.035
6280

1

**

*

NLSY 2014
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Table 6: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Intermittent Coverage by Respondent
Characteristics, 2008-2014

Stna
Error

Female

0.728

(0.052)

Never Married
Separated
Divorced

1.271
1.477
1.4

(0.142)
(0.213)
(0.133)

Widowed
Age

09

(0.260)
(0.016)

Hispanic
Black

1.545
126

(0.144)
(0.107)

Has Child

1.210

(0.134)

0.708

-(079)

*

0.979

(0.001)
(0.002)

-

2012

Od
Ratio

S
Error

77

(0059)

1.236
1.279
1.5

(48)
(0.198)
(0.124)

77
133
096

(0,301)
(0.016)

Odds
Ratio

2014
S
r
Error

Ratio

Standard
Error

0883

(.67

*

1.286
1.874
1.554

(0.156)
(0.286)
(0.148)

*

2010

odds
Ratio

-

0960

(0.269)
(0.016)

*

2008

**

.
1.093

(0.125)
(0.098)

1.140

(0.135)

1112

(0.126)

-andr

*

*

8

(

1.488
1.599
1.383

(0.176)
(0.247)
(0.134)

1=226
0.97

(2)1
(0.016)

**

(0.145)
(0.098)

*

1.357
1.157

(0.136)
(0.103)

(0.166)

*

1.180

(0.139)

0.542

(0.061)

.**

0.793

(0087)U

**

0.977

(0.001)

.**

0.981

(0.001)

***

0.977

(0.001)

*

1001

(0.001)

-

1.002

(0.001)

-

998

(0.002)

*

0.752

(
(1.136)

-

1.293
0127

-

5752

*
*

.437

T.75
1356

-

*

*

*

*

*

Demographic
Characteristics

Employment/Income

%of Weeks

7

Worked
Household Income

***

($1k)
1600

06843

Intercept
R Squared

1.091
0.141

Number of

6230

I

Observations

* p<0.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.

(0.064)
(0.822)

2.916
0.151

35

00
-

Personal Debt

($1k)
Health Limitations

(2.453)

*

0.9

(0.074)

3.5
0.141

(3.213)

55

***
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2010
Odds

Standard

2012
Odds

Standard

2014
Odds

Standard

Ratio

Error

Ratio

Error

Ratio

Error

2.068
0.700

(0.349)
(0.101)

*

1.811
0.777

(0.340)
(0.110)

1.897
1.419

(0.401)
(0.240)

0.801
1.109
1.255

(0.072)
(0.159)
(0.225)

*

(0.090)
(0.246)
(0.338)

*
**

0.915
1.194
1.849

(0.103)
(0.215)
(0.403)

Divorced

1.161

(0.134)

(0.180)

**

1.466

(0.208)

Widowed
Age
Hispanic
Black
Has Child

1.117
0.969
1.524
1.128
1.405

(0.306)
(0.019)
(0.180)
(0.122)
(0.209)

***
*

0.969
1.695
1.837
1.498
1.180
0.979
1.475
1.333
1.186

1.256
0,959
1.121
1.223
1.004

(0.385)
(0.024)
(0.173)
(0.161)
(0.171)

0.363
0.978

(0.048)
(0.002)

*
*

0.715
0.983

(0.101)
(0.002)

1.372
0.981

(0.252)
(0.002)

Personal Debt ($1k)
Health Limitations
Intercept

1.000
0.487
2.520

(0.001)
(0.067)
(2.503)

*

1.001
0.808
0.637

(0.002)
(0.107)
(0.686)

1,001
0.762
1.080

(0.002)
(0.127)
(1.486)

R Squared

0.149

Coverage Provider (vs.
job)
Privately Purchased
Govemment

*

*

Table 7: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Intermittent Coverage by Respondent
Characteristics and Coverage Type, 2010-2014

Demographic
Characteristics
Female
Never Married
Separated

(0.328)
(0.020)
(0.184)
(0.146)
(0.170)

*

*

Assistance

% of Weeks Worked
Household Income

*

*

*

Employment/Income

($1k)

0.118

0.107

Number of
5686
5314
5091
Observations
* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Note: Coverage provider is based on the coverage reported at the time of the previous interview. Those with no
coverage at the time of the previous interview were omitted to focus on differences between types of providers.
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